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Abstract—A repeated game is an effective tool to model
interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their
objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative
games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for
multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other
players’ past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt
their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among
wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor
network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this
paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different
wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of
repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby
improving network performances and avoiding network disrup-
tion due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems
in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models
together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this
survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research
directions.
Keywords- Repeated games, wireless networks, game the-
ory, Folk theorem, subgame perfect equilibirum.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics, which is
used to study interactions among “intelligent” and “rational”
participants (i.e., players) in a multi-agent decision making
process (i.e., a game). In a game, the players want and are
able to choose optimal strategies to maximize their benefits or
payoffs. Game theory is widely used in many areas such as
economics, computer science, military, evolution biology, and
so on. In general, game theory can be divided into two main
types, i.e., static and dynamic games. Static games model an
interaction among players when they take actions only once in
a single period. By contrast, dynamic games are applied when
players take actions over multiple periods. In particular, the
dynamic game is played repeatedly. Therefore, in the dynamic
games, the players can observe the behaviors of the other
players in the past and are able to adjust their strategies to
achieve their goal. In this paper, we focus on one of the most
important types of dynamic games, namely repeated games
and their applications in wireless networks.
Although there are some existing materials and resources
presenting the applications of game theory in wireless net-
works such as [1], [2], there exists no survey specifically for
the repeated game models developed for wireless networks.
This motivates us to deliver the survey with the objective
to provide the necessary and fundamental information about
repeated game models in wireless networks. Hence, through
this article, the readers will understand how repeated games
can be used to address different issues in wireless networks.
Moreover, the rapid development of wireless networks brings
many benefits for human beings; however, it also brings
many challenges for researchers. The future wireless networks
often have unique characteristics that differ from conventional
wireless networks. For example, in mobile cloud comput-
ing [3], we need to take not only the impact of wireless
transmissions, but also cloud computing into account. As a
result, in order to apply repeated games for problems in the
next generation wireless networks, we have to consider the
special characteristics of each network and then find models
and appropriate solutions for using repeated games. This paper
will be the first step to encourage researchers to explore
applications of repeated games for future wireless networks.
In addition, there are many advantages of using repeated
games in wireless networks which will create favorable con-
ditions for researches in this area.
1) Interactions among nodes and users in wireless networks
often happen repeatedly over multiple time periods.
Thus, the nodes are able to observe actions of their
opponents in the past. Repeated games allow players
to adjust their actions and adopt a certain strategy in
response to other players’ behaviors to optimize their
long-term benefits which cannot be done through using
a static game.
2) In wireless networks in particular, the selfishness nature
of players who aim to achieve their own objectives
is common. Consequently, they will act responsively
only to their interest without concerning about social
welfare or network-wide performance. This can cause
deleterious effects to all players involved. To encour-
age cooperation, we can impose rules and mechanisms
(e.g., punishment) to self-enforce the players. Such rules
and mechanisms can be modeled in repeated games in
which the players are aware of potential benefits from
cooperation through long-time interactions.
3) In wireless networks, communication is not perfect due
to channel variations such as noise, fading, and signal
attenuation. Additionally, network nodes are limited by
hardware and energy supply. Repeated games offer a
complete framework for handling noisy, incomplete and
imperfect information about the network. Additionally,
repeated games can support distributed decision making
by using local information, thereby avoiding communi-
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy of applications of repeated games in wireless networks.
cation overhead and minimizing energy consumption.
4) Repeated games support diverse equilibrium solution
concepts which are suitable for different requirements
of wireless networks. System designers have choices to
implement rules and mechanisms to achieve a desirable
outcome of the games developed to resolve problems
in existing and emerging wireless networks. In addition,
any feasible solution can be theoretically maintained by
the repeated game, which is proved by Folk’s theorem.
5) With the vigorous development of mathematical tools
for solving complex problems of repeated games, we
can apply many variations of repeated game models to
address specific and characteristics issues of wireless
communication environment. For example, to deal with
problems with noise or imperfect information which
are common in wireless environment, we can apply the
model of repeated game under the noise or imperfect
information as shown in the next sections.
In Fig. 1, we present the taxonomy of repeated game
applications for wireless networks which is organized based on
network models. Basically, we consider three major wireless
networks, i.e., structured networks (i.e., cellular and wireless
local area networks), unstructured networks (i.e., wireless ad
hoc networks) and cognitive radio networks. Additionally,
there are other wireless networks with unique characteristics
which will be also introduced in this paper. The use of this
taxonomy stems from the fact that different networks have
distinct properties that lead to different problems and issues
to be solved.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the background and basic of repeated games. In
Sections III-V, the reviews of different existing work are
given. We highlight trends and summarize current research
in Section VII. Moreover, we outline some open issues and
present some research directions in Section VII. Finally, we
summarize and conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. FUNDAMENTAL OF REPEATED GAME
The repeated game theory provides a formal framework
to model a multi-player sequential decision making process
and to explore the potential cooperation in the long run. In
this section, we provide some preliminary of a repeated game
and its variants. We then provide some comparison with other
optimization and game theoretic approaches.
A. Definitions and Fundamental Concepts
The basic component of a repeated game is called the
stage game G, which is a finite N -player simultaneous-move
game in a strategic form, also called a normal form. The
stage game can be represented by < N , (Ai), (ui) > with
a finite action space Ai, and payoff function ui for player
i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, where N is the total number of
players. In a repeated game, denoted by GT , the players
play the same stage game for T rounds or periods (possibly
T → ∞). At the end of each round, the same structure
repeats itself. In other words, the game in the current stage
does not change the structure of the next stage. Usually,
repeated games assume the availability of a common entity
that produces a publicly observed signal, uniformly distributed
and independent across periods1, so that the perfect public
information is available at all players.
Repeated games can be broadly classified into two types,
depending on whether the time horizon, i.e., the number of
periods, is finite or infinite. The infinite time horizon game is
suitable for the situations where players always presume the
game to be played one more round with a high probability
(i.e., without a known termination point). The finite time
horizon game describes the situation where the information
about termination of playing game is commonly known.
Let at ≡ {at1, at2, . . . , atn} denote the actions used by all
players in round t. Suppose that the game begins in round
1In this paper, we use round, period and game stage interchangeably.
3t = 1, for t ≥ 2, let ht = {a1, a2, . . . , at−1} denote the
actions used at all rounds before t, and let Ht = (A)t be
the space of all possible round-t histories. In each period, the
players can observe all history in each previous period. Let Ai
be the space of probability distribution over Ai. The infinitely
repeated game is formally defined as following.
Definition 1. Let A∞ represent the set of infinite sequences
of action profiles. An infinitely repeated game of a stage
game G is an extensive game with simultaneous form moves
based on perfect information < N,H,P, (?i ) >, where
H = {∅} ∪ (⋃∞t=1At)∪A∞, P is a profile that maps every
non-terminal history h ∈ H to each player, ?i is a preference
relation on A∞ that satisfies the following notion of week
separability: if (at) ∈ A∞, a ∈ A, a′ ∈ A, and ui(a) >
ui(a
′), then for all t, we have (a1, . . . , at−1, a, at+1, . . .) ?i
(a1, . . . , at−1, a′, at+1, . . .).
Note that in a repeated game, a strategy for player i assigns
an action Ai for every finite sequence of outcomes in G.
Similarly, finitely repeated games with a fixed known time
horizon T is formally defined as following.
Definition 2. A T-round finitely repeated game of G is an
extensive form game of perfect information satisfying all
the conditions of Definition 1, with ∞ replaced by T . The
preferences can be represented by the mean payoff expressed
as follows:
∑T
t=1 ui(a
t)/T .
The overall payoff of a player i ∈ N is a weighted average
of the payoffs in each period, which is given by
ui = (1− δi)
T∑
t=1
δtiui(a
t). (1)
The factor (1 − δi) normalizes an overall payoff so that the
payoffs in the repeated game are on the same scale as in the
stage game. The discount factor δi can be interpreted in two
ways. Firstly, it denotes how much a future payoff is valued
at the current period. Secondly, a player is patient about the
future, but the game ends at any round with probability 1-δi.
Definition 3. In a repeated game, since all players observe
ht, a pure strategy si for player i is a sequence of maps
sti. This maps possible round-t history h
t ∈ Ht to actions
ai ∈ Ai. A mixed strategy σi is a sequence of maps σti from
Ht to mixed actions αi ∈ Ai.
A repeated game is suitable for modeling long-term inter-
actions and relationship among multiple players, and it can
achieve a good equilibrium outcome. Unlike a single stage
game, repeated interaction among players is induced in a
repeated game which may lead to the cooperation instead of
defection. This is due to the threat of potential punishment
by other players in future rounds of the game. In particular,
in the design of a repeated game, a strategy can be chosen
to compensate the player for his instantaneous payoff loss
due to cooperation, by rewarding the player later using an
additional payoff that will be more than the current loss. Thus,
punishment rules are required to avoid the player deviating
from a socially optimum point.
B. Equilibrium Concepts and Strategies in Repeated Games
1) Equilibrium Concepts: In a normal-form stage game,
each player is concerned only about its own payoff, and will
choose the strategy accordingly. The most commonly used
solution concept of the stage game is the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4. A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if
for every player i and every strategy σ′i,
ui(a(σ)) ≥ ui(a(σ−i, σ′i)). (2)
At the Nash equilibrium, none of the players can improve its
payoff by a unilateral deviation. The Nash equilibrium strategy
is the best for a player if the others also use their Nash
equilibrium strategies. However, the Nash equilibrium has
some shortcomings. Firstly, there may be no Nash equilibrium
in a game. Secondly, there may exist multiple Nash equilibria
in a game. Therefore, some equilibrium may be better than
other equilibria and the players have to choose one of them.
Third, compared with the centralized optimization, the Nash
equilibrium might have poor performance, which is called the
Price of Anarchy.
For an extensive-form repeated game, strategies are played
repeatedly to guarantee the Nash equilibrium at any subgame
of the initial state game. The outcome is the subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Definition 5. A strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium, and for every history
h(t), every player i, and every alternative strategy σ′i,
ui(a(σ, h(t))) ≥ ui(a(σ−i, σ′i, h(t))). (3)
For a repeated game with a finite number of stages, back-
ward induction is commonly used to obtain the subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Typically, there are more than one equilibrium in the game.
Therefore, it is important to define and evaluate a preference
among equilibrium outcomes. A common approach is to
measure an optimality, which is called Pareto optimality. The
Pareto optimality is the payoff profile that no strategy can
make at least one player better off without making any other
player worse.
Definition 6. Let Σ ⊆ RN be a set of possible payoffs. For σ,
σ′ ∈ Σ, if ∃ σ′i > σi and @ σ′i < σi, then σ′ Pareto dominates
σ. Then σ ∈ Σ is Pareto optimal if there exists no σ′ ∈ Σ
for which σ′i > σi for all i ∈ N . And σ ∈ Σ is strongly
Pareto optimal if there exists no σ′ ∈ Σ for which σ′i ≥ σi
for all i ∈ N and σ′i > σi for some i ∈ N .
Pareto optimality serves as the approach to restrict a large
set of repeated game equilibria when the players are patient.
The Pareto frontier is referred to as the set of all σ ∈ Σ
that are Pareto optimal. For the case with multiple equilibrium
outcomes, the ones on the Pareto frontier are superior to others.
2) Strategies: The above equilibrium concepts describe the
properties of an equilibrium outcome, but they do not address
the problem how to reach the equilibrium outcome of a
game. Indeed, as the repeated games are the extensive form
of the stage games, the strategies in the repeated games are
4TABLE I
COMMON STRATEGIES IN REPEATED GAMES.
Strategy Description
Always cooperate Cooperates on every move
Always defect Defects on every move
Random play Random (defect/cooperate) on every move
Grim Cooperate until one of others defects then defect forever
Tit-for-tat (TFT) Start by cooperating and repeatedly select the last strategy played by the opponent
Generous TFT Same as TFT, except that it cooperates with a probability q when the opponent defects.
Tit for two tats Cooperates on the first move and defects only when the opponent defects two times
Two tits for tat Same as TFT except that it defects twice when the opponent defects
Suspicious TFT Same as TFT, except that it defects on the first move
Contrite TFT Same as TFT when no noise. However, in a noisy environment, once it receives a wrong signal because of error, it will choose
cooperation twice in order to recover mutual cooperation.
Adaptive strategy An adaption rate r is used to compute a continuous variable “world” according to the history moves of the opponent.
Cartel maintenance In this strategy, players first compute a cooperation point that has better payoff than Nash equilibrium points. If any player deviates
from the cooperation while others still playing the cooperative strategy, all other players will defect in next game stages.
Forgiving strategy A player starts with cooperation and he plays cooperation (C) as long as everybody played C in this past. If anybody plays defection
(D) at any period, then the player plays D for the next k periods. After k periods of punishment he returns to playing C until
someone deviates again.
Cheat-proof In game theory, an asymmetric game where players have private information is said to be cheat-proof (of truthful mechanism) if
there is no incentive for any of the players to lie about or hide their private information.
highly dependent on the best actions in the stage games. We
therefore introduce some principles in the design of strategies
for repeated games.
A simple approach is to check whether a given strategy
profile of a repeated game constitutes a subgame perfect
equilibrium. This is one-shot deviation principle.
Theorem 1. One-Shot Deviation Principle: A strategy profile
for a finitely repeated game is a subgame perfect equilibrium
if and only if there is no history such that the player can
increase its payoff in the subgame following that history by
choosing a different action at the beginning of the subgame
while leaving the remainder of its strategy unchanged.
By applying the one-shot deviation principle, a remarkable
reduction in complexity of finding equilibrium strategies can
be achieved.
For finitely repeated game, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2. If the stage game G has a unique Nash equi-
librium a∗. Then, for any T , the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in the T-horizon repeated game GT is given by the
strategy profile in which every player after every non-terminal
history chooses a?i . If the state game G has multiple Nash
equilibria, then any outcome hT = (a1, . . . , aT ), in which
for every t (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) the action profile at is one of the
Nash equilibria of G, can be obtained as the outcome of the
subgame perfect equilibrium of GT .
For infinitely repeated game, the following two theorems
hold.
Theorem 3. Nash Folk Theorem: For every feasible payoff
vector v with vi > v−i for all players i, there exists a discount
factor δ < 1 such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1) there exists a Nash
equilibrium of G(δ) with payoffs v.
This theorem indicates that when the players are patient
enough, any one-stage gain with a finite value is outweighed
by even a small loss in payoff in every future round.
Theorem 4. Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem: Let a? be a
static Nash equilibrium of the stage game with payoffs v?. For
any feasible payoff u with ui > v?i , for all i ∈ N , there exists
some δ < 1 such that for all δ > δ, there exists the subgame
perfect equilibrium of G∞(δ) with payoffs u.
The subgame perfect Folk theorem shows that any payoff
above the static Nash equilibrium payoffs can be the payoff
of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
Typically, repeated games employ trigger strategies to incen-
tivize cooperation and punish any defecting player if a certain
level of defection (i.e., the trigger) is observed. Let aDi denote
the defection payoff of player i, given that other players play
the equilibrium strategy, a?−i. Let a
P
i represent the punishment
payoff of player i. Generally, we have aDi > a
?
i > a
P
i . To
design the trigger strategy for a repeated game, the following
condition should hold, i.e.,
a?i
1− δ ≥ a
D
i +
δaPi
1− δ , (4)
which gives,
δ ≥ a
D
i − a?i
aDi − aPi
. (5)
Note that the level of punishment and the sensitivity of
the trigger vary with different trigger strategies. In Table I,
we have summarized some of the well-known strategies in
repeated games applied to wireless networks.
C. Variations and Extensions
Next, we briefly discuss some variations and extensions of
a repeated game that are often used in wireless networks.
1) Repeated Game under Noise: The above introduced
repeated game can be regarded as the game played in a noise-
free environment. Namely, all direct or indirect observations
in the repeated games are assumed to be correct. However, in
reality, there exist errors in observing other’s behavior by the
players. A repeated game under noise is an alternative tool
that can model the situations when the players have wrong
knowledge about their opponents. In particular, two types of
5error could occur during the iterations of play [32]. The first
type of error, namely a perception error, accounts for the
wrong observation of other players. The second type of error
explains the wrongly taken action instead of the intended one
due to the interference in the environment, which is called an
implementation error. For example, a relay node in a multihop
network may misunderstand the behavior of other nodes in
the same network, i.e., due to the perception error, if the relay
node makes the decision to take a cooperation action (i.e.,
to relay packets of other nodes). However, due to temporary
poor channel condition, the packets may not be successfully
forwarded. Inadvertently, this is possibly observed as a selfish
defection instead of a cooperative relay action. This is the
implementation error.
Usually, noise appears in the form of random errors, which
consequently makes the possible outcomes in each stage
unpredictable. Thus, the players can only make responses
based on expected stage payoffs. The existence of noise in
an environment considerably increases the complexity of the
repeated games. Moreover, cooperation becomes much more
difficult to maintain [49]. Typically, there exist three ap-
proaches to address the noise issues in a repeated game [117].
The first approach is called “generosity” which lets players
tolerate some noncooperative behavior and with some certain
degree the players do not punish a deviating player. The
second approach is called “contrition”. This approach allows
contrition in a reciprocating strategy to avoid responding to the
other player’s defection aroused by its own unintended action.
The third approach, namely “win-stay, lose-shift”, adopts the
strategy that repeats the same action if the latest payoff is high,
but changes the action otherwise.
2) Repeated Game with Imperfect Public Monitoring:
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players
cannot directly observe the other players’ strategies, but can
observe imperfect and public signals about them. The players’
information is a stochastic public signal, the distribution of
which is dependent on the strategy profiles chosen by the
players. Similar to perfect public monitoring, there is also a
recursive structure in the case with imperfect public monitor-
ing. However, there is often no proper subgame, and thus a
subgame perfect equilibrium may not be effective. To address
this problem, the concept of perfect public equilibrium [13]
has been introduced. In this concept, the players can make
public strategies based on public history, which is a sequence
of realization of the public signal. The Folk theorem for
imperfect public information has also been proposed in [4].
3) Repeated Game with Imperfect Private Monitoring:
Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring deal with
the situations that the public information of players are not
openly available, and each player can only obtain imperfect
private information about the other players through its own
direct or indirect monitoring. ,The difficulties associated with
private monitoring lie in two aspects [5]. Firstly, the games
lack recursive structure which yields the equilibria that do not
possess a simple characterization. Secondly, at each round,
players must conduct statistical inference on what others are
about to do. There are mainly two model settings that bypass
the above two difficulties. One is called No Discounting
Model, or δ-Rationality, in which there is no discounting loss,
i.e., δ=1, or the discounting loss in the average discounted
payoff is tolerated. Another one is Communication Model [7],
which introduces communication in the repeated games. At
each stage, the players are asked to reveal their private signals,
but they can tell a lie if that is beneficial. By constructing
equilibria where a player’s report is used to force other play-
ers, truth-telling can be used among players and equilibrium
strategies can be devised based on the publicly observable
history of communication.
4) Repeated Game with Incomplete Information: In a re-
peated game, when some players lack information of the
others, they are said to be with incomplete information, and
their games are accordingly called repeated games with incom-
plete information. This type of game is developed to capture
widely existent situations in which a variety of features of the
environment may not be commonly known by all the involved
players. Unlike a repeated game with imperfect (public or
private) monitoring, the player with incomplete information
might not have common knowledge of the followings: i)
payoffs of himself and other players; ii) who/what types the
other players are; iii) what actions are possible for himself and
other players; iv) how the action affects the outcome; v) what
are the preferences of the other players; vi) what the other
players know about what he knows.
A variant for Folk theorem has also been introduced in
[36] for a repeated game with incomplete information. It
is proven that any payoffs that Pareto-optimality dominates
the Nash equilibrium can be sustained at an equilibrium of
a finitely repeated game with incomplete information. With
incomplete information, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a
general solution concept [135]. In a Bayesian repeated game,
the players make the best response action based on the beliefs
about the other players’ strategies. During the repetition of the
game, the players can iteratively update their beliefs through
learning [168].
D. Comparisons with other tools
We provide some brief comparison among a repeated game
and other commonly used optimization or game approaches.
1) Markov decision process (MDP): An MDP [8] is an
approach to make optimal sequential decisions under uncer-
tainty. It is designed for a player making a decision based on a
state and interacting with a system or environment. An MDP
model is composed of a state, action, and reward. The policy
is a mapping of a state to an action. When an action is taken
at any state, a player receives a reward. An optimal policy is
to maximize long-term reward, which could be discounted or
average reward [9]. However, the MDP is for decision making
of a single player. An interaction among multiple players over
multiple time periods cannot be modeled using an MDP.
2) Stochastic game: Stochastic game [10] is a generaliza-
tion of an MDP with some applications in wireless networks.
Strategies in stochastic games are made based on the history
statistic of the interactions. Specifically, in each round, a player
makes decisions based on a competitive policy. After the action
is taken, the current state transits to the next state. By contrast,
6in a repeated game, there is no need for a state transition.
Additionally, a player’s strategy is not necessarily dependent
on the past values of its opponent’s randomizing probabilities.
Instead, it can depend only on the past values of its opponent’s
payoff. This major difference differentiates the applications of
repeated games and stochastic games.
3) Coalition formation game: A coalition formation game
[11] is a type of a cooperative game that models an interaction
of players by forming coalitions to improve their individ-
ual payoffs. The strategies for forming a stable coalitional
structure among the players can be broadly classified into
two types: myopic and far-sighted. The former allows the
players to adapt their strategies given the current state of
the coalition, while the latter lets the players make their
strategies by learning, and predicting future strategies of the
other players. A repeated game is similar to the far-sighted
coalition formation game in that both games capture long-
term payoffs. The main difference is that a repeated game
can model different strategies (e.g., punishment), not necessary
cooperation.
4) Differential game: A differential game [12] is an exten-
sion of an optimal control framework which aims to find an
optimal dynamic control strategy for the system with multiple
agents and single agent, respectively. In differential games,
the strategy is a continuous function of time. The solution of
differential games can be the open-loop or the close-loop Nash
equilibrium. Again, unlike repeated games, the differential
game lacks a trigger and punishment cannot be implemented.
Furthermore, differential games need an ordinary differential
equation and the utility function is typical linear quadratic,
which limits the scope of applications a lot.
III. APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED GAMES IN CELLULAR
AND WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORKS
In this section, we review repeated game models developed
to solve problems in cellular and wireless local area networks
(WLANs). The repeated games have been used to address the
following issues.
• Multiple Access Control: In cellular and WLANs, wire-
less nodes need to connect to common access points,
and this leads to a contention in accessing a common
radio resource. Repeated games are used to control the
access and also enhance network performance through
encouraging the nodes to cooperate.
• Security: Instead of competing with each other which
can cause the damage to all nodes, wireless nodes can
choose a cooperation solution to improve their benefits.
However, this cooperation is based on mutual trust, and
thus if a player is selfish or malicious, the partnership may
be severed. Repeated games are used to detect deviations
and enforce players into the cooperation.
• Quality-of-service (QoS) Management: Service
providers need to manage the relation with other
partners, e.g., customers or other providers to optimize
their profits while guaranteeing QoS for the customers.
Repeated games are used by the service providers to
manage the interaction with other partners to minimize
the cost and maximize the revenue.
In the following, we provide the reviews for related work
based on aforementioned issues.
A. Multiple Access Control
In cellular and wireless local area networks (WLANs), wire-
less users communicate with each other or with the Internet
through access points and base stations. Therefore, one of the
challenges is the access control for multiple users. This section
will review the repeated game models for multiple access
control problems under two access methods: decentralized
and centralized access. Fig. 2 outlines the corresponding
approaches.
Multiple Access Control
Decentralized 
access method
Centralized 
access method
Transmission 
power control
Access probability 
control
Bandwidth allocation 
management
Data rate 
management
Fig. 2. Solutions for the multiple access control problems in cellular and
WLANs.
1) Decentralized access method:
a) Transmission power control: MacKenzie [14] is one
of the first pioneers in applying repeated games to power
control problems in wireless networks. There are multiple
users sharing the same spectrum allocated by a base station.
In the repeated game, the players are the users. Each player
chooses a non-negative power level to transmit signals to the
base station. The payoff of each player is the number of bits
successfully transmitted per time slot. The authors introduced
the trigger strategy in which at the beginning of the game
the players cooperate by transmitting signals at the desirable
received power. If anyone uses more energy, which causes
interference to the other users, in the next time slot all other
users will increase their power levels to the noncooperative
Nash equilibrium to punish the deviating player. Such a
punishment lasts for one shot-game after the deviating user is
detected. After that, the users cooperate again by using mild
power levels.
Similarly, Han et al. [15] also considered the power control.
The players are the nodes, but the actions are transmission
rates instead of power levels as in [14]. The payoff for each
player is a function of profits obtained for each successful
transmission minus the cost for link usage. To encourage
players to cooperate in the repeated game, the authors used
the Cartel maintenance strategy [16]. Specifically, at an initial
time, the players will transmit data at a cooperative transmis-
sion rate predeterminedly agreed. The players then compute
the successful transmission probability and compare it with a
threshold. If the computed successful transmission probability
is lower than the threshold, they choose the noncooperative
strategy in the next few game stages. Afterward, all the players
will re-cooperate. To determine the optimal parameters, the
7authors used the policy gradient method as presented in [16].
Under the proposed strategy, it is proven in [17] that the
solution of this game is a perfect public equilibrium [18].
Different from [14] and [15] where wireless users can trans-
mit data to the base station simultaneously, Auletta et al. [19]
assumed that there is at most one successful transmission at
each game stage. The player successfully transmits data if
and only if its signal strength is higher than the total signal
from other players and the noise. Since there is at most one
player successfully transmitting data, the authors applied the
alternating transmission strategy. At each game stage, only
one player is allowed to transmit. If the player transmits
data, but the transmission fails, i.e., someone deviates from
the cooperation, the punishment will be implemented in the
next few stages. In the punishment phase, all the players will
transmit data with the highest power level.
In the above work [14], [15], and [19], the channel between
nodes and the base station is assumed to be constant over
time. However, in some cases, this assumption is inapplicable.
Therefore, the authors in [20] investigated two cases with
channel variations, namely, fast power control (FPC) and slow
power control (SPC). In FPC, the channel gain is constant over
the game stage. In SPC, the channel gain can be varied over
the game stages. The payoff is a ratio of the transmission
rate multiplied with the successful transmission rate and the
transmission power level. It is shown that the static one-shot
game has a non-saturated Nash equilibrium. The authors also
proposed a trigger strategy for the nodes and it is proven that
the repeated game has a subgame perfect equilibrium. The
proof for the existence of the equilibrium can be found in [21].
To detect any deviating player, the authors proposed the
following detecting mechanism based on the public signal. If
players cooperate, the public signal will be constant. However,
if someone deviates, the public signal will not be constant, and
thus players will change to noncooperative strategy.
For the channels with SPC, since the channel gain can
vary, the payoff of each player depends not only on the joint
actions, but also on the channel gains in each game stage. The
repeated game therefore becomes a stochastic repeated game
(SRG) that is modeled through the irreducible state transition
probability. In SRG, the Folk theorem is no longer useful since
the stage game changes over time, and thus the authors applied
the extended theory of the Folk theorem which is proven for
the stochastic games with public information [22]. With the
extended Folk theorem, it is demonstrated that there exists a
perfect public equilibrium strategy of the stochastic game.
b) Access probability control: Cagalj et al. [23] studied
the multiple access problem in CSMA/CA networks. The
CSMA/CA networks operate based on the assumption that the
users are honest, and they follow the protocol predefined in
a standard (e.g., IEEE 802.11 DCF [24]). However, selfish
users can modify the rules defined by the protocol to receive
more benefits. Consequently, the honest users will experience
poor performance and unfairness in using a common radio
resource. In the repeated game, the players are wireless users,
their actions are selections of channel access probabilities,
and the payoff function is achievable throughput. The authors
developed the distributed learning algorithm for the users to
adjust their behaviors such that their strategies converge to the
Pareto optimal point. However, with the proposed algorithm,
the player may not follow the designed rules and deviate from
the cooperation. Thus, the authors proposed the detection and
penalizing mechanism. To detect deviating users, the authors
assumed that the users are able to measure the throughput
of all other users in the network. Thus, if any user has its
throughput that is different from other users, it will be treated
as a deviating player. Then, the penalizing mechanism is
executed that the packet transmitted by the deviating user will
be jammed by the other users in the cooperation.
While the solution proposed in [23] requires the modi-
fication in the MAC layer of wireless nodes, the proposed
approach in [25] can protect wireless users from selfish users
without any change to the MAC protocol. With the same
players, their actions are the selections of backoff configura-
tions. The authors defined three configurations for the nodes,
i.e., to choose a standard backoff configuration predefined by
IEEE 802.11, a greedy configuration which will access the
channel once a collision happens, and a selfish configuration
that will access channel after a collision happens in two time
slots. The payoff is the throughput. The payoff at every game
stage is equally weighted (i.e., there is no discounting for
future payoffs). Thus, the payoff can be quantified by the
liminf-type asymptotic [26]. The authors then proposed a co-
operation strategy via randomized inclination to selfish/greedy
play (CRISP) to detect and punish selfish nodes. By using
CRISP, all the strategies of the nodes are the subgame perfect
equilibrium. However, the condition for the existence of the
subgame perfect equilibrium is that the payoff function of
players must be liminf-type asymptotic [26].
2) Access management based on a central node: In the
following, we will review two schemes for network access
through using a central node. In the first scheme, the central
node will decide the amount of bandwidth that each node
uses. In the second scheme, the central node will indicate the
transmission rate for each node.
a) Bandwidth allocation management: The authors
in [27] examined a non-monetary mechanism introduced
in [28] for the bandwidth allocation problem with the aim to
achieve the Pareto optimal equilibrium. The authors adopted
the concept of service purchasing power which is interpreted
as a “constant budget”. The purchasing power is determined
based on the closed contrast between the customer and the
service provider. Based on the users’ service purchasing power,
the base station will calculate the allocated bandwidth for each
customer given a predefined rule. In the repeated game, the
players are the nodes and they can select two actions, namely,
cooperate or defect. The player defects if it uses the maximal
allocated bandwidth, while the player cooperates if it utilizes
the allocated bandwidth only if its marginal utility exceeds
marginal social costs. To enforce the players to cooperate,
the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy is applied. To detect and punish
the defecting user, the base station will monitor the users’
behaviors and compute their weighted ratios. If the player
is cooperative, the base station will improve the purchasing
power of this player. Consequently, this player may receive
more bandwidth in the next game stage. By contrast, if a player
8defects, the base station will reduce the purchasing power, and
thus this player will have less allocated bandwidth.
Unlike in [27], the authors in [29] considered the bandwidth
allocation based on the traffic demand of users. The mobile
users first declare their traffic demands to the base station,
and then the base station will decide the amount of bandwidth
allocated to the users. However, the users may report fake
demand, and thus repeated games are used to prevent selfish
users and enforce them into cooperation. The authors applied
a cost function in the payoff of the players. Specifically, when
the users submit traffic demand, the base station will charge a
fee depending on the demand. The payoff is the profit obtained
from transmitting packets successfully minus the cost. With
the proposed truthful mechanism, it is shown that the selfish
users cannot gain higher payoff than that of honest users,
and hence the selfish users have no incentive to deviate from
truthful declaration.
While the bandwidth allocation problem is solved based
on the contract as in [27] and the traffic demand as in [29],
in [30] the decision relies on the channel condition reported
from users. After the users send channel state information to
the base station, the base station decides the leading player on
each channel based on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the
users. Apparently, weak users with a poor channel condition
may have no opportunity to transmit/receive data. Therefore,
repeated games is used to allow the user to cooperate and
bring opportunities for weak users. In this game, users who
achieve high profit but do not cooperate will be punished by
adding cost in the next game stage. Thus, selfish users will
have no incentive to deviate.
b) Data transmission rate management: The authors
in [31] studied the packet scheduling problem in a wireless
mesh network in which Mesh clients communicate with a
mesh router. The mesh clients report their channel conditions
to the mesh router. Based on this information, the mesh
router selects and allows one mesh client to transmit in the
current time slot. However, mesh clients could be selfish
and report bogus channel information to the mesh router.
Consequently, the selfish client can gain benefits while the
overall network performance will be adversely affected. To
address this problem, the authors proposed a trigger strategy,
namely “Striker,” to detect and punish selfish users when
they report fake information. In this strategy, if the player
is detected to defect, all other players will report the highest
channel condition to the mesh router in the next game stage.
This punishment lasts for a certain number of periods. To
detect the defector, each mesh client will measure the average
data rate of other mesh clients and compare with a predefined
threshold.
In [33], the authors studied the allocation that allows mul-
tiple users to transmit data to the access point simultaneously.
The authors built the framework for multiple accesses by
proposing two new entities, namely, the regulator and the
system optimizer. The users send their service requirements
to the regulator and report channel state information to the
system optimizer. Based on the received information, the
regulator will compute the pricing parameter, and the system
optimizer will determine and send the optimal power allocation
to the users. The selfish user can gain benefits by transmitting
misinformation about its channel state to the system optimizer.
Therefore, a trigger strategy is applied at the system optimizer
to detect and punish the selfish user. For detection, after
observing the actual rates of the users and comparing them
with the reported channel, the system optimizer can identify
the cheater that will be removed from the cooperation. With
this strategy, the honest users always gain benefits, while the
selfish user will be punished and receive low overall payoff.
However, the framework cannot apply when there are multiple
cheaters.
In the same context, the authors in [34] also studied the data
transmission rate control problem. However, the base station
is also treated as a player in the game. Therefore, the players
are wireless nodes and the base station. The actions of the
wireless nodes are the transmission power levels and the action
of the base station is the decoding order. The players make
their decisions simultaneously at each game stage. The payoff
of the wireless nodes is the achievable rate, while that of the
base station is the revenue that the wireless nodes pay per unit
rate. The authors then designed the strategy to enforce nodes
to cooperate. At the beginning, the base station announces
its rate reward vector to the players, and then based on the
rate reward each player determines the optimal rate control
that maximizes sum rate achievable by using the optimal
centralized control policy as presented in [35]. If the player
is detected to be a deviator, the base station will decode for
this player first for some periods and other players will do
water-filling algorithm during these periods. It is proven that
the achievable transmission rate of the deviating node will be
reduced, while that of others will be maximized. Based on the
Fudenberg and Maskin theorem [36], it is shown that under
the proposed strategies, when the repeated game is infinitely
played, all the boundary points of the capacity region are
achievable and the obtained equilibrium of the repeated game
is subgame perfect equilibrium.
B. Security
In this section, we review the repeated game models to
address some security issues. We classify them into three types
based on the interaction of users with their partners as shown
in Fig. 3.
1) Interaction between user and user: In mobile commerce
(M-commerce) markets, transactions are performed online and
free-control by authorities and thus buyers can cheat sellers by
agreeing buying/using goods/services offered by sellers, but do
not pay fees as agreed. Therefore, a repeated game model was
introduced in [37] to address this problem. The authors first
defined two terms, i.e., member and M-alliance. The member
is a trader (seller or buyer) who takes part in one M-alliance to
perform transactions, and each member belongs to only one
M-alliance. Each transaction is considered as a stage game,
and if the game is played only once, the seller and buyer will
always choose a cheating strategy that leads both of them to
gaining nothing. However, if the game is played repeatedly,
there is an incentive for the players to cooperate by choosing
an honest strategy. In the repeated game, the players are the
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Fig. 3. Interaction between (a) user and user, (b) user and service provider, and (c) user and eavesdropper.
seller and buyer, and they can choose one of two actions,
namely, honest or cheat for each transaction. The payoff is
the profit that the players gain after each transaction. The
authors then proposed a trigger strategy to enforce players to
cooperate. If any cheater is detected (player A), the cheated
player (player B) will notify to its M-alliance (MB). The
MB then checks whether the complaint is true or not. If the
complaint is true, the MB will ask the MA (M-alliance of
player A) for compensation. After verifying the information,
the MA will ask player A to compensate for player B. If player
A does pay the compensation, the game is still in cooperation.
However, if player A does not compensate, the MA will revoke
its membership and send a warning message to other M-
alliances. Now, if the MA compensates for player B on behalf
of player A, then the MA still keeps its reputation. However,
if MA does not compensate, its reputation will be reduced that
will impact to transactions of all members in its alliance. The
authors then designed the conditions for the punishment such
that the selfish players do not have any incentive to deviate
from cooperation.
2) Interaction between user and provider: While in [37]
the repeated game is used to deal with the cheating problem
between a user and another user, in [38], Antoniou et al.
developed the repeated game model to handle a cheating
problem between a mobile user and a network provider. In
particular, the mobile user sends a request for QoS support
with a compensate price to the provider. After receiving the
request, the provider will deliver QoS to the user. However,
the user can pay less than the price that it offers. Similarly,
the provider can be honest by proving QoS as promised or
cheat by providing lower QoS. The players make decisions
simultaneously, and they know the actions of each other only
after the game ends. Thus, if the game is played only once, the
players will choose to cheat. However, if the interaction be-
tween them is repeated over multiple periods, the cooperation
by making honest actions is the best strategy. Additionally,
to punish the deviating player, the authors consider many
punishment strategies, e.g., grim, TFT, and leave-and-return.
Based on the analysis, it is found that the best strategy for the
mobile user is leave-and-return (i.e., cooperate as long as the
provider cooperates and defect for one period if the provider
defects) and the best strategy for the provider is TFT. The
paper can be extended by considering the optimal pricing and
resource allocation to support QoS.
3) Interaction between user and eavesdropper: In [39], the
authors studied the security problem in multiple-input single-
output (MISO) wireless networks. The main goal is to prove
that the eavesdroppers’ noncooperation assumption, which is
often used in the literature, is not always true. The authors con-
sidered the scenario in which there are two eavesdroppers that
want to know the information about the transmission between
an authentic transmitter Alice and an authentic receiver Bob.
The transmitter Alice is assumed to be equipped with MISO
technology. The authors indicated that the eavesdroppers can
cooperate if the interaction between them is repeated. The
players of the game are the eavesdroppers and their actions
are to choose to cooperate or not cooperate. If they are
noncooperative, they will choose zero power for relay signal.
Alternatively, if they cooperate, the signal power will be
greater than zero. The payoff of the eavesdropper is the mutual
information between the transmitter Alice and itself. If the
game is a one-shot game, it is shown that optimal strategies
for both eavesdroppers are noncooperative. However, if the
game is played repeatedly for a sufficiently many periods and
under a set of appropriate conditions for channels and payoff
functions, it is proven that there is an equilibrium point in
which the eavesdroppers will cooperate in the repeated game.
C. Quality-of-Service Management
Next, we review the work related to the Quality-of-Service
(QoS) management from the perspective of service providers.
Specifically, the service providers aim to achieve maximum
revenues while the QoS for their customers is still guaranteed.
There are three cases that are summarized in Fig. 4. We
consider three scenarios corresponding to the interactions
between a provider and another provider, a mobile user, and
a relay node.
1) Operation management of base stations: In [40], the
authors studied the scenario with two operators as the players
and each operator has a set of base stations. The operators
want to maximize the number of users attached to their base
stations by increasing the transmission range of their base
stations. However, when the transmission range is increased,
the interference among them is also rising. Therefore, the
actions for the players are to choose the transmission range for
their base stations such that the coverage area is maximized
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Fig. 4. Interaction between (a) provider and provider, (b) provider and user, and (c) provider and relay node.
while the interference is minimized. For a one-stage game,
the players will choose the maximum transmission range
for their base stations, causing severe interference. However,
if the game is repeated, there is an incentive for them to
cooperate by reducing the transmission range to an optimal
value (i.e., a cooperation point). The authors then applied a
trigger strategy for the players. At the beginning, the players
cooperate by setting the transmission range at the cooperation
point. Then, if any user deviates, the players will set the
maximum transmission range for their base stations in the
next few periods until the deviating players cooperate again.
Under the proposed strategy, it is proven that the operators can
achieve the Pareto optimal equilibrium. However, the authors
did not show how to detect the deviating players.
While in [40] the authors considered the transmission range
control problem of base stations, in [41], the authors studied
the transmission power control problem. Similar to [40], a
repeated game is also used to model the interaction among
base stations. However, in [41], the actions of the base stations
are to select the transmit power levels, and the payoff is
impacted by a density function of mobile nodes. The authors
first used the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining [42] to find the
cooperative point of the game. Then, a trigger strategy is used
to enforce the nodes into cooperation. To detect deviating
nodes, the suspect detection procedure [43] is developed and
and it is shown that the players’ strategies converge to an
optimal point.
2) Infrastructure upgrading: The authors in [44] used game
theory to analyze the interaction between mobile users and
service providers. In each period (e.g., a monthly billing cy-
cle), the provider needs to make a decision to invest money to
improve or to keep its infrastructure, while the users will make
a decision to stay with the same provider or change to another
provider. In the one-shot game, both of them will choose the
noncooperative strategy, i.e., the provider will not invest and
the user will change the provider due to higher cost and better
performance, respectively. However, if the interaction between
them lasts for multiple periods, there will be an incentive for
them to cooperate. By applying the grim trigger strategy, it is
shown that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium for the
users and provider in which the provider will invest money to
improve the infrastructure and the users will not change the
provider. Additionally, the authors considered the case with
imperfect monitoring. Specifically, the authors assumed that
the users’ actions are public and monitored by the provider.
However, the provider’s action is private, and thus the users
do not know the actions of the provider. Thus, this can
reduce the profit of the provider because in some cases
though the provider improves the network, mobile users still
receive the low quality of service due to the other factors
(e.g., shadowing), and thus they will change the provider.
The authors then established the condition for the provider to
continue to cooperate under the patience and the monitoring
accuracy of the users. However, the practicability has to be
further evaluated since it may be intractable to measure the
patience as well as monitoring accuracy of users.
3) Bandwidth sharing with relay nodes: In [45], the authors
considered the interaction between a base station (eNB) and
a relay node (RN) in a downlink dual-hop LTE network. In
the repeated game, the players are the base station and RN.
Their actions are to choose the number of physical resource
blocks (PRBs) to access. It is clear that assigning more PRBs
to the node can improve throughput. However, since PRBs
are limited, the interference between the nodes sharing the
same PRB can increase. Therefore, the node can choose one
of two strategies, either to cooperate by choosing PRBs with
high channel gains and letting its opponent use these PRBs,
or to not cooperate by utilizing all PRBs assigned. To make
player cooperate in the repeated game, a trigger strategy is
used that will punish the deviating node for T periods if this
node does not cooperate. Furthermore, to reduce the number
of punishment periods, the authors proposed using a penalty
factor in the payoff function of the players. This factor reduces
the additional achieved throughput if the player is punished.
Simulation results then show that the proposed solution can
improve the total achievable throughput.
Summary: In this section, we have identified three main
issues in cellular and WLAN networks (CWLANs) and re-
viewed applications of repeated games for these networks. We
summarize the issues along with references in Table II. From
the table, we observe that many papers investigate the multiple
access control problem, while security and quality-of-service
(QoS) problems are less studied. Additionally, Fig. 5 shows the
relation among different types of repeated game models, their
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APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED GAMES IN CELLULAR AND WLAN NETWORKS (SPE = SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM, BS = BASE STATION, TFT =
TIT-FOR-TAT, CRISP = COOPERATION STRATEGY VIA RANDOMIZED INCLINATION TO SELFISH/GREEDY PLAY)
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[14] wireless nodes transmission power levels successful transmission data Cartel maintenance SPE
[15] wireless nodes transmission rates profits minus cost Cartel maintenance SPE
[17] wireless nodes transmission rates profits minus cost Cartel maintenance perfect public
[19] wireless nodes transmission power levels profits minus cost forgiving SPE
[20] [21] wireless nodes transmission power levels a function of transmissionrate and power level Cartel maintenance perfect public
[23] wireless nodes channel access probability throughput adaptive Pareto optimal
[25] wireless nodes backoff configuration throughput CRISP Pareto optimal
[27] mobile users the use of bandwidth throughput TFT Pareto optimal
[29] mobile users report traffic demand successful data transmission cheat-proof Pareto optimal
[30] wireless nodes report channel condition a function of datatransmission rate punishment trigger Pareto optimal
[31] mesh clients report maximal data rate achievable data rate forgiving SPE
[33] wireless users channel information andservice requirement profits minus cost cheat-proof Pareto optimal
[34] wireless nodesand BS
nodes: power levels, BS:
decoding order
achievable rate for wireless
nodes and revenue for BS forgiving SPE
Se
cu
ri
ty
[37] mobile seller andbuyer honest or cheat profits cheat-proof SPE
[38] mobile users andnetwork provider honest or cheat profits
users: leave-and-return
provider: TFT SPE
[39] eavesdroppers cooperate ornoncooperate mutual information punishment trigger SPE
Q
oS
[40] BSs transmission range of BSs cover area Cartel maintenance Pareto optimal
[41] BSs transmission power level a function of achievable rateand density function Cartel maintenance Pareto optimal
[44] mobile users andservice provider
users: stay/leave,
provider: improve/remain
QoS for users and profits
for provider Grim SPE
[45] BS and a relaynode
the number of physical
resource blocks throughput forgiving Pareto optimal
strategies and solutions. From Fig. 5, it is found that while
conventional repeated games (i.e., with perfect information and
monitoring) are mostly used, their variations (e.g., a repeated
game with imperfect monitoring) are not much adopted.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED GAMES IN WIRELESS
AD HOC NETWORKS
In this section, we review the repeated game models devel-
oped for wireless ad hoc networks, which are known as infras-
tructureless networks. Such networks are multihop networks,
sensor networks, cooperative transmission networks, and peer-
to-peer networks. In wireless ad hoc networks, wireless nodes
can communicate directly with each other without relying
on any infrastructure or pre-configuration as illustrated in
Fig. 6. Thus, there are many advantages and applications of
wireless ad hoc networks in practice as discussed in [46], [47].
However, lack of infrastructure poses many issues such as in-
terference, decentralization, limited-range, and insecurity [46],
[47]. In this section, we review the applications of repeated
games in wireless ad hoc networks in the following aspects.
• Packet forwarding: In multihop networks, wireless
nodes transmit packets to a distant destination through
the support from other intermediate nodes. However, the
nodes may belong to different authorities and forwarding
process consumes a certain amount of resource of for-
warders or relays. Therefore, repeated games are used to
motivate the nodes for the cooperation.
• Cooperative transmission: Cooperative transmission or
simply called relay networks can help improving perfor-
mance in terms of speed and reliability through amplify-
and-forward and decode-and-forward techniques. How-
ever, energy is a crucial resource and has to be efficiently
utilized. Repeated games are also used to encourage the
cooperation for cooperative transmission networks.
• Resource sharing in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks: In
a P2P network, users help each other to acquire the
desired services, for example, content distribution. Re-
peated games are used in this network to avoid free-riding
behaviors of users and enforce them into cooperation.
• Miscellaneous issues: Besides aforementioned issues,
repeated games are also used to address other issues in
wireless ad hoc networks such as clustering, spectrum
accessing, and security.
A. Packet Forwarding
Due to the cost of forwarding packets over multihop net-
works (Fig. 7(a)), we need to design mechanisms to encourage
nodes to cooperate and enhance network performance. In
general, there are three available mechanisms used to in-
centivize nodes for cooperation, i.e., credit-based, reputation-
based, and game-based methods. For credit-based methods,
e.g., Nuglet [48] and Sprite [16], nodes receive the payment
if they accept to forward packets for others. However, this
method needs a centralized accounting server to manage pay-
ments. Consequently, it may not be suitable for decentralized
networks such as ad hoc networks. Therefore, in the following,
we will discuss two approaches, i.e., reputation-based and
game theoretic.
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1) Reputation-based Schemes: Different from the credit-
based approach which needs a central authority for payment
management, the nodes in reputation-based multihop networks
are able to monitor and observe their neighbors’ behaviors
autonomously and independently. In the reputation-based net-
works, the node updates reputation values of its neighbors
based on its observations and information provided from other
nodes. Then, the node decides to forward or reject packets for
its neighbors. Accordingly, the nodes have to take into account
the future effects of their present actions. This implies that
repeated games can be used to model the interaction among
nodes in reputation-based multihop networks.
General reputation-based networks, e.g., SORI [50] and
Catch [51], work based on the assumption that every node
has to maintain the reputation of its neighbors, i.e., fraction
of their forwarded packets. However, when collisions happen,
a node can be treated as defecting, and thus its reputation
will be degraded though it is cooperative. To deal with the
collisions, the authors in [52] modeled the interaction between
two nodes as a Prisoner’s Dilemma with noise [117] and used
the generous TFT strategy to enforce nodes into the cooper-
ation. Additionally, to detect and sustain the cooperation, the
reputation-based mechanism is proposed. In the mechanism,
each node evaluates its neighbors’ reputation based on their
packet dropping probabilities. Under appropriate conditions, it
is proven that a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a mutual
cooperation of the game.
In [52], to achieve a full cooperation between users, a per-
fect estimation of reputation is needed. Therefore, in [57], the
authors proposed a reputation strategy, namely distributed and
adaptive reputation mechanism (DARWIN) that can achieve
a full cooperation without the perfect estimation. With this
strategy, each node estimates reputations of its neighbors, and
then shares this information with others. Based on the repu-
tation information received, each node evaluates whether its
neighbor is cooperative or noncooperative. Then, by using the
modification of the TFT strategy, called Contrite TFT [117],
it is proven that DARWIN can also achieve a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Extended from [52], Ji et al. [53] examined a belief-based
packet forwarding approach which was developed in [54] to
cope with not only noise, but also imperfect observation in
reputation-based networks. In this approach, a node needs to
maintain a belief probability distribution function with other
nodes to estimate their actions. Then, based on this function,
the node makes a decision to forward or reject a packet. After
each game stage, the nodes will update their belief functions
by using Bayes’ rule [55]. Then, their strategies are adjusted
for the next game stage according to their beliefs. By using the
proposed approach, it is proven that under some appropriate
conditions, the proposed strategy is a sequential equilibrium.
A sequential equilibrium [55] is a well-defined counterpart
of a subgame perfect equilibrium for repeated games with
imperfect monitoring. The sequential equilibrium ensures that
there is no incentive for deviating users. The simulations show
13
Peer
Streaming 
Server
Source
Destination
Source Destination
Relay 2
Relay 1
Cloud
Peer
Peer
Peer
Forwarder 1 Forwarder 2
(a) Multi-hop networks (b) Relay networks (c) P2P networks
Fig. 7. Illustration of (a) Multihop networks (b) Relay networks, and (c) Peer-to-peer networks
that the proposed strategy achieves not only the sequential
equilibrium, but also near-optimal performance.
Similar to [53], in [60], the authors also studied belief-based
approaches to obtain sequential equilibria. However, in [60],
the authors proposed a more efficient method to circumvent
the complexity of updating beliefs as in [53]. The idea is
based on a state machine. In particular, each node has two
states (corresponding to two actions), called cooperate (C)
or noncooperate (N). Based on signals observed from the
environment, each node will make its decision to stay at the
current state or switch to another state. The simulation results
indicate that the performance achieved from the proposed
strategy outperforms other noncooperative strategies.
In [61], the authors proposed a solution that even does not
need to compute belief functions for the nodes as in [53]
and [60]. The solution is based on a belief-free equilib-
rium [64], [65] that does not need to determine other nodes’
private history, and hence the computation of the optimal strat-
egy is not necessary. Consequently, the strategies considered
in this paper do not depend on a node’s own action and the
equilibrium construction is not as complex as in [60]. The
authors considered a repeated game with random states. The
game is modeled as a stochastic game instead of a simple
repeated game. Since in each game stage, the node may or
may not have packets to send. Thus, stages of the game
can be random and different over time. Additionally, the
authors used a monitoring technique (similar to a watchdog
mechanism [66]) for the nodes to monitor the behavior of
their neighbors. The signals received from observing actions
from the opponents are used to adjust the packet forwarding
probability. If the nodes are observed to be cooperative, the
packet forwarding probability will be one. Otherwise, the
probability will be reduced. By using this strategy, it is proven
that the nodes can achieve the belief-free equilibrium solution.
The authors in [58] also proposed a new method to over-
come the limitations in [53] by using repeated games with
communication and private monitoring (RGC&PM) [59]. In
RGC&PM, the nodes are assumed to be able to communicate
with other nodes to exchange information about the behaviors
that they can observe. The information can be used to identify
the deviating node. Then, the distributed learning repeated
game with communication framework was proposed to find
and maintain cooperation among the nodes. The authors also
showed that with the proposed repeated game framework,
any cooperation equilibrium that is more efficient than the
Nash equilibrium can be achieved by using some punishment
strategies. Then, the learning algorithms are introduced to
help the nodes achieve the efficient cooperation equilibria.
The simulations demonstrate that the proposed framework can
achieve 70% to 98% better performance compared to that of
the centralized optimal solution.
While in [53], the authors examined repeated games with
imperfect observation, in [56], the authors investigated re-
peated games with imperfect monitoring. There is a slight
difference between them. In imperfect observation games, the
players are not sure about the actions of others in each game
stage. As a result, they need to maintain a belief function
to evaluate opponents’ actions. By contrast, in imperfect
monitoring games, the players cannot monitor explicitly other
nodes’ actions, and thus they will use a random public signal to
infer their actions. The notation “public signal” was introduced
in [13], and it has to satisfy some certain properties. By using
the public signal it is proven in [13] that there exists a perfect
public equilibrium for the repeated game with imperfect mon-
itoring. In the context of wireless ad hoc networks, a public
strategy of a node is a perfect public equilibrium if after every
game stage the public strategy forms the Nash equilibrium
from that stage onward. The authors then applied the grim
trigger strategy for the nodes to punish deviators and enforce
them to cooperate.
In the above reviewed papers, when the node does not
forward packet for others, it will be treated as a selfish
node and will be punished. However, in many practical cases,
nodes do not forward packets because they are unable to
do so. For example, the nodes occasionally cannot forward
packets due to energy depletion. Thus, if these nodes are
treated as selfish nodes and are excluded from the cooperation,
the performance of the network will be degraded severely.
Therefore, the authors in [67] focused on designing a power
control mechanism for the nodes with uncertainty. There is
some subtle difference in defining actions and the payoffs of
the nodes compared with other papers. Specifically, in each
round, each node chooses not only the transmit power level,
but also the forwarding probability. The node then broadcasts
this information to its neighbors. The main goal of the node
is to maximize its own throughput, while minimizing the
energy consumption. Therefore, the payoff function is defined
by the ratio between the successful self-transmission rate and
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the total power used (for both self-transmission and packet
forwarding). In the game, each time slot is divided into two
phases. In the first phase, the nodes need to make a decision
on the amount of energy used to send packets (including its
own packets). The node will forward packets for others if it
believes that the energy consumption for forwarding is lower
than the rewards to be received in the future. The beliefs of
the nodes then are updated based on the Bayes’ rule. In the
second phase, the nodes have to determine the probability to
forward packets for others in the next time slot. Similar to
the first phase, the beliefs are used to infer the forwarding
probability. The proposed strategy is shown to be the Pareto-
dominate equilibrium numerically. However, theoretical proof
is still open.
2) Game-based Schemes: In reputation-based approach,
intermediate nodes decide to forward packets based on the
reputation. Nevertheless, propagation of nodes’ reputation
increases an overhead in the network. Furthermore, the rep-
utation can be lost, forgotten or manipulated and thus game-
based methods have been introduced. In game-based methods,
the node decides whether to forward packet according to its
defined strategy, thereby avoiding the problem as in reputation-
based approach.
In [68], repeated games are used to model the interaction
of nodes. The nodes as the players need to choose the action
to forward or reject when they receive a packet from other
nodes. If the node accepts the packet, it has to spend a certain
amount of energy to forward the packet. Thus, the node has
to balance between the number of its own packets and the
number of packets from other nodes to be forwarded. In
the repeated game, the authors used a punishment strategy,
namely, generous tit-for-tat (TFT) to enforce the node to
cooperate with the aim to find a Pareto optimal point. To
make the decision to accept or reject, the node has to monitor
all packets that it sends and that the other nodes send to it.
Based on this information, the node computes the acceptance
probability and makes the decision to accept/reject incoming
packets.
A similar model and approach are also considered in [69].
However, in this paper, instead of adjusting the acceptance
probability, the action of the node is to determine the number
of packets that it will send and the number of packets it will
receive and forward. The TFT strategy is used. It is shown that
the condition for the node to forward packets is that the amount
of traffic forwarded by others is at least equal to that the node
forwards. However, this can lead to unfairness because the
deviating node will be punished severely forever.
To overcome the unfairness issue in [68], the authors in [70]
proposed a new punishment scheme which can be seen as
an improvement of generous TFT strategy used in [68]. At
the beginning of the game, the nodes choose the strategy
“cooperate” by forwarding packets that they receive. If the
node defects from the cooperation, all the other nodes will
continue monitoring and cooperating with this node for the
next p− 1 stages. If the deviating node continues noncooper-
ating after p stages, all nodes will punish the deviating node
for q stages by rejecting the packets from this node. During
the punishment, if the deviating node regrets and wants to
re-cooperate, it can help other nodes forward packets without
sending its own packets for r stages. After that, the deviating
node can return to the cooperation. Otherwise, this node will
be punished forever. By using this strategy, the nodes can avoid
the unfair punishment as in [68] and the network performance
can be improved significantly.
Similar to [70], the authors in [77] also proposed a fair
solution, called a restorative trigger strategy. In this strategy,
the nodes take a cooperative strategy by forwarding packets
in the first two stages. In each game stage, if the cooperation
is maintained, the node updates its estimation of the “selfish-
ness”. If the “selfishness” is lower than a predefined threshold,
the node still cooperates in the next stage. Otherwise, it will
switch to a defection state and report the selfish node to others.
The selfish node will be removed from the cooperation and
if the selfish node wants to re-cooperate, it has to forward
packets for other nodes until the cooperation expectation
of the selfish node is greater than a certain threshold. The
similar approach of using a punishment strategy and learning
algorithm is considered in [71]. The action is the packet
forwarding probability which is optimized to achieve better
network performance.
In the same context, the authors of [81] developed a new
strategy to achieve better results than that of [71]. This strategy
is based on the idea of the weakest link (TWL) borrowed from
a famous TV game show that encourages players to cooperate.
The nodes form a route from a source to a destination and the
nodes in this route are considered as the candidates of a chain
in the TWL game. Each node has the payoff defined based
on its cooperation level, i.e., its packet forwarding probability.
To enforce the nodes to cooperate, an infinite repeated self-
learning game model is developed. In each game stage, each
node observes its payoff and the cooperation level of others.
Accordingly, the node adjusts its forwarding probability. If the
node defects from the cooperation, it will be excluded from
the cooperation for a certain number of stages. If the node
wants to return to the cooperation, it has to raise its forwarding
probability and notify to the others. The simulation results
show that the proposed solution of [81] outperforms solutions
of [71].
In the aforementioned strategies, there exist an infinite
number of Nash equilibria and in general not all of them are
efficient. Therefore, in [72], the authors evaluated a few criteria
with the aim to remove the Nash equilibria that are less robust,
less rational, or less likely strategies. These criteria are sub-
game perfection, Pareto optimality, social welfare maximiza-
tion, proportional fairness, and absolute fairness. Furthermore,
in [72], the authors considered the case where the nodes can
report information dishonestly to gain their own benefits. The
authors demonstrated that in the considered packet forwarding
game, there is no incentive for the nodes to report honestly
their private information. Therefore, the authors concluded
that when cheating is possible, the node will not forward
more packets than its opponent does for it. To address this
problem, a Cartel maintenance profit-sharing (CAMP) strategy
was proposed in [73]. With CAMP, the nodes start the game
by cooperation, i.e., reporting the true forwarding cost. Then,
in each round, the nodes check their payoffs. If their payoffs
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are lower than the expectation thresholds, they switch to play
noncooperative game for a certain number of periods before
returning to the cooperation state.
In the above reviewed papers, the nodes can implement
their strategies under the assumption that they are able to
monitor perfectly the actions of all the other nodes in the
network. However, this assumption is vulnerable due to the
hardware limitation or noise/interference especially in a wire-
less environment. To address the imperfect monitoring prob-
lem, the authors in [79] proposed a repeated game model
with communication. The key idea is based on the Aoyagi’s
game [80], which is a repeated game with private signals
communicated among players. After receiving private signals
at the end of each game stage, the nodes decide to cooperate
or defect. However, selfish nodes can report fake information
to gain their own profits. Therefore, the TFT strategy is
applied to enforce the nodes into cooperation by revealing
true information. The equilibrium solution obtained by the
proposed strategy is a perfect public equilibrium.
In previous work, the strategies applied in repeated games
are uni-strategy, i.e., all nodes take the same strategy. However,
in some cases, nodes may not follow and they can use strate-
gies that they prefer. For example, one node can use the TFT
strategy while others apply the grim strategy. Alternatively,
the node can take the TFT strategy at the beginning of the
game, but it switches to the grim strategy latter. The divergent
strategies form a mixed-strategy repeated game that is very
complex to analyze. Consequently, in [74], the authors used
simulations to study the cooperation behaviors among nodes
which are similar to an evolutionary game [75]. Five strategies
are studied, called, always cooperate, always defect, random,
TFT, and gradual strategy. The core idea of the gradual strategy
is based on the adaptiveness strategy [76]. In particular, a node
will start by cooperating and remain using this strategy as long
as its opponents cooperate. Then, if this node detects someone
deviating, it will defect for one stage and cooperate for two
stages. After the N -th defection, the node will defect for N
consecutive stages and cooperate for two stages. Many results
are highlighted by comparing the performance of different
strategies. For example, in the environment without noise, the
gradual strategy achieves the best performance. However, with
noise, the gradual strategy performs merely better than others
when the noise ratio is high, e.g., 30%.
Similar to [74], an evolutionary game theory (EGT) was
used in [78] to enforce selfish users into the cooperation.
Some strategies studied are TFT, grim, Pavlov [62], and
pPavlov [63]. Through using the EGT framework, the authors
showed that by using Pavlop or pPavlop strategies, no selfish
nodes can gain benefits by playing a noncooperative strategy.
The advantage of the Pavlop strategy is that it can be im-
plemented in a distributed fashion, as it requires only local
information.
3) Methods to Deal with Malicious Users: In the previous
subsections, we review the methods to deal with selfish users
and enforce them into the cooperation. In this section, we
present the applications of repeated games to tackle with
malicious users. While selfish users act only to gain their
benefits noncooperatively, the malicious users aim to harm and
degrade intentionally network performance. There are some
papers from George Theodorakopoulos et al. studying the
problem of malicious behaviors in wireless ad hoc networks.
The first paper [82] considers one malicious user in the
network. Then the case with more than one malicious user
is considered in [83]. Next, in [84], a mechanism to detect
malicious users is presented.
In particular, the authors assumed that the users who want
to disrupt the network are “Bad” users and the rest are the
“Good” users. Bad users aim to degrade network performance,
while Good users aim to maximize their benefits in a long-term
basis. The actions for each node are to forward (cooperation)
or reject (defection) packets. Good users can choose to forward
or reject packets for their neighbors as long as their long-
term payoffs are maximized. Moreover, the authors assumed
that Bad users are intelligent. Specifically, instead of always
choosing to reject the packets, Bad users can choose to forward
packets randomly to deceive other Good users. Thus, it is
difficult for the Good users to detect and punish the Bad users.
The general scenario considered in these papers is as follows.
Good users want to cooperate with other Good users, but not
with Bad users. Thus, Good users try to find Bad users as
soon as possible thereby reducing harmful interactions with
Bad users. However, Good users do not know who Bad users
are. The Good users can detect Bad users only if the game is
played repeatedly.
In [82], the authors considered only one malicious (Bad)
user in the network. This Bad user is unknown by Good users
in advance, but they can gradually detect the Bad behavior
through repeated interactions. To detect the Bad user, the
Good users will use a randomized policy, i.e., Good users
will cooperate with probability p independently at each round.
The probability is set to maximize Good users’ payoffs. With
the randomized policy, it is proven that the Bad user will be
detected by Good users after some periods of the interaction.
The authors finally showed that the proposed strategy can
achieve Nash equilibria and form the cooperation among Good
users.
In [83], the authors then extended for the case with multiple
malicious users in the network. Instead of using the random-
ized policy as in [82], the authors applied a fictitious play
model [85] and proposed an equilibrium algorithm for Good
users. In the fictitious play, each Good user assumes that its
neighbors’ actions are chosen independently and identically
distributed following the Bernoulli probability distribution.
Hence, at each game stage, the Good users will choose
the action that yields the highest payoff for them given the
estimations of their neighbors’ strategies. The main conclusion
is that if the ratio of cost per benefit for the Good users is high,
the achievable payoff of Bad users will be low. Finally, in [84]
the authors proposed the mechanism to detect malicious users
for the game model proposed in [83]. In this mechanism, a
Good user will construct a star topology of connections with
its neighbors where the Good user is a central. The central
Good node is able to monitor all actions of its neighbors as
well as obtained payoffs. From this information, the central
Good user can identify the Bad user.
In addition to the methods proposed by Theodorakopoulos,
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Tootaghaj et al. [86] also introduced a security mechanism
that detects not only selfish, but also malicious users. In
this mechanism, a node can generate their private/public keys
and share them over the network by an independent public
key infrastructure. After receiving packets, the node will
send a confirmation message to its upstream hop. Based on
the confirmation messages, the nodes can identify selfish or
malicious nodes and perform punishment accordingly.
B. Cooperative Transmission
Relay networks based on cooperative transmission typically
work in two phases as illustrated in Fig. 7(b). In the first
phase, a source node broadcasts a message to the destination
and relay nodes. In the second phase, the relay nodes help the
source node transmit data to the destination. The destination
node combines all signals received from the source and relay
nodes to extract information. By using relay nodes, the quality
of the signals received at the destination can be significantly
improved. However, the relaying process consumes additional
energy of the relay nodes, which may discourage relay nodes
from the cooperation. In the following, we review the repeated
game models developed for cooperative transmission in relay
networks. In general, there are two methods used for coop-
erative transmission, namely, amplify-and-forward (AF) and
decode-and-forward (DF) [87]. For the AF transmission, the
relay nodes amplify signals received from the source node
before transmitting to the destination. For the DF transmission,
relay nodes decode the source information before forwarding
to the destination.
1) Amplify-and-Forward Relaying Transmission: In [88],
Yang et al. considered a relay network with two source
nodes along with two corresponding destination nodes. In this
network, each source can use another source node as a relay
node to transmit data to its destination through the half-duplex
orthogonal cooperative AF protocol as shown in Fig. 8(a).
First phase Second phase
(a) Single-Relay Orthogonal Cooperative Protocol
First phase Second phase
(b) Single-Relay Non-orthogonal Cooperative Protocol
Fig. 8. The difference between (a) single-relay orthogonal cooperation
protocol and (b) single-relay non-orthogonal cooperative protocol.
The authors studied two cases for this model, namely, with-
out and with fading channels. In the case of non-fading chan-
nels, similar to packet forwarding games, the authors modeled
the interaction between two source nodes as a repeated game
and showed that there exists a cooperative Nash equilibrium.
In this game, the players are two source nodes. Their actions
are to relay or not. Their payoff is the amount of energy
saved. With fading channels, the repeated game becomes
more complicated to find the cooperation points for source
nodes. Specifically, at each game stage, the channel status is
different, and thus the amount of energy saved also differs.
Consequently, the payoff matrix is varied over game stages.
To enforce the source nodes to cooperate, the authors proposed
a conditional trigger strategy. In this strategy, the decision of
each source node depends on the instantaneous value of the
current payoff matrix and the statistic of its future payoffs that
can be interpreted as the value of relay energy for other source
nodes. The proposed conditional trigger strategy is proven
to be a cooperative Nash equilibrium. Through simulations,
it is shown that the proposed strategies achieve high energy
efficiency, and it is close to that of the centralized optimization
solution. A similar model is also presented in [96]. However,
in [96], the authors used the Q-learning algorithm to help
nodes achieve the expected values.
The authors in [94] proposed an extension of [88] that
resolved two limitations in [88]. Firstly, the authors introduced
the solution that does not need to rely on centralized controlled
energy allocations as presented in [88], [96]. Secondly, the
authors extended the model with more than two source nodes.
Specifically, the authors used a bargaining solution to find
efficient energy allocation strategies that can be performed
locally for source nodes. Then the repeated game framework
is used to determine sufficient conditions for the mutual
cooperation between the source nodes. In the repeated game, a
trigger strategy is introduced to encourage nodes to cooperate.
The node has to choose action “relay” if the bargaining
solution specifies that the required direct transmission energy
for that node is greater than zero. Otherwise, this node
will be punished forever. Under the proposed strategy and
satisfied necessary conditions, it is proven that the mutual
cooperation is possible in both fading and non-fading channel
cases. Furthermore, to extend the model with more than two
players, the “stable roommates” algorithm [95] is applied to
form partnership among players. Numerical results show that
the proposed strategies can dramatically improve the energy
efficiency for the relay network.
In [88] and [94], only one relay node is considered. How-
ever, multiple relay nodes are more commonly in practice that
is impossible to use the half-duplex AF protocol. To address
this issue, the authors in [90] used a non-orthogonal protocol
which allows multiple relay nodes to transmit packets to the
destination over the same frequency band at the same time as
illustrated in Fig. 8(b). In the proposed system model, the
relay network is modeled as an exchange market game in
which the nodes trade their transmission power to gain data
rate. The cooperation cycle formation algorithm is proposed
to help nodes achieve the strict core of the game. The concept
of “strict core” was introduced in [91], [92] with the aim to
achieve the Pareto optimal, individual rational and strategy-
proof solution [93]. Additionally, to punish selfish users and
revive the cooperation, a dynamic punishment strategy is
presented which is proven that the full cooperation is a Pareto-
dominant equilibrium.
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2) Decode-and-Forward Relaying Transmission: While the
AF cooperative transmission is a better choice for uncoded
systems, the DF relaying protocol is especially appropriate
for the systems using powerful capacity-approaching codes.
In DF relay networks, when a relay node receives a request
from a source node, it can choose to cooperate by relaying the
decoded (and then re-encoded) data, or dismiss the request.
Similar to AF relaying systems, repeated games are also
used to model and encourage the cooperation. In [89], the
authors studied DF relaying networks under fading and non-
fading channel scenarios. In the case of non-fading channel,
the authors proved that there exists a mutually cooperative
Nash equilibrium between two nodes when the game lasts for
multiple periods. In the case of fading channels, the authors
used a Markov chain to model the status of the channel with
two states, namely, BAD or GOOD. Moreover, it is assumed
that the players abide by the following strategy. If the player
does not cooperate in the current period, it will be punished
in the next K − 1 periods. Since the payoff is a function
of the uplink signal to noise ratio, the authors examined two
types of function, i.e., convex and concave payoff functions.
For convex payoff functions, it is possible to find the co-
operative Nash equilibrium for the repeated game. However,
for concave payoff functions, a mutually cooperative Nash
equilibrium may not exist under the bad channel conditions.
Then, two specific concave payoff functions are examined,
namely, Shannon capacity and transmission success rate. The
authors demonstrated that with these functions, cooperation
can be achieved by setting an appropriate weight for the future
payoff.
C. Resource Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
The goal of P2P networks is to share resources among par-
ticipants without or with minimal support from a centralized
server. In [97], the authors considered the interaction between
two participants (i.e., players). Similar to relay networks, in
P2P networks, a player uses a service provided by other
players. However, providing the service also incurs a certain
cost. Using a one-shot game to model this situation, it is shown
that all players will not cooperate. However, with repeated
games, the cooperation can be sustainable. In [97], the authors
highlighted that noise or link failure can cause misbehaviors
for players, and thus they proposed an improvement, called,
proportion increment TFT strategy. With this improvement,
after a player is treated as a deviator because of noise, the
cooperation probability of peers will be updated based on a
cooperation ratio function and the probability will converge to
the cooperation point between two peers if both peers continue
cooperating. The results show the efficiency of the proposed
strategy compared with the classical TFT strategy, and it can
even reduce the adverse effect from the malicious behavior in
P2P networks.
In [97], the authors assumed that the requests from partic-
ipants are identical, i.e., the same quality-of-service and the
same cost and profit. Differently, the authors in [98] studied
a resource sharing problem in a wireless live streaming social
network for users with heterogeneous types. Each user has
a type of {laptop, PDA, cellphone} and a buffer to store
content. Video streaming from a service provider is divided
into chunks and the users with different types have different
costs of sharing and different gains of the received chunks.
In each round, the users report their buffer information of
each other, and then they send their chunk requests. After
receiving the request, the users will decide how many chunks
that they will transfer. The payoff is determined by the gain
minus the cost of transferring. The users do not know, but they
have beliefs about the opponent’s types. By using a Bayesian
repeated game, the authors showed that there exist an infinite
number of Bayesian-Nash equilibria (BNE). However, not all
the BNE are efficient and thus the authors proposed different
solutions including Pareto optimality, bargaining solution, and
cheat-proof cooperation strategies with the aim to encourage
users to cooperate for better performance. The authors finally
concluded that to maximize the payoffs and to circumvent
cheating behaviors, the players should always agree to send
chunks as shown in time-restricted bargaining strategy quota.
In [99], the authors extended the two-player game model
proposed in [98] for multiple players. When a user requests
chunks from the other users at different time slots to maximize
its payoff, the requests for chunks may not be simultaneously
received. Therefore, a repeated game is inapplicable and the
solutions used in the two-player game cannot be used directly.
The authors proposed a multiuser cheat-proof cooperation
strategy, and in [100], it is proven that this strategy is a
subgame perfect and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium. The
request-answer and chunk-request algorithms were proposed.
They will reward more for the users who share more video
chunks. This will encourage users to cooperate. The results
demonstrate that by using the proposed strategy, the users
have incentive to cooperate and they can achieve cheat-free
and attack-resistance for the networks.
Similar to [98] and [99], the buffer cheating attacks in
P2P wireless live video streaming systems were considered
in [103]. Instead of using bargaining cheat-proof cooperation
strategy, the authors in [103] considered proportional fairness
optimality criteria and proposed a cheat-proof strategy to
deter buffer cheating attackers. While the cheat-proof strategy
in [98] is based on hiding private information and thus users
have to bargain the amount of chunks that they exchange, the
cheat-proof strategy in [103] is based on a fairness solution. In
particular, the user gains nothing if it does not share any chunk.
With the proposed strategy, the authors concluded that the user
will not cheat if its opponent does not refuse to cooperate
in the previous round or if there is no useful chunk in the
opponent’s buffer.
While in the above papers, repeated games are used to
model the interaction between users in P2P networks, in [101],
the authors used a repeated game to study the relation between
a content server and users. The content server needs to assign a
reward to users, while the users have to decide the transmission
rate to forward packets received from the content server. It is
assumed that the content provider and users follow a Stack-
elberg game [133] in which the content server (i.e., a leader)
assigns the reward first, and then the users (i.e., followers)
choose the transmission rate based on the reward. The authors
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showed that for the one-shot Stackelberg game, the Stackel-
berg equilibrium can be achieved through using the backward
induction technique [133]. The authors then extended the static
Stackelberg game model to the repeated Stackeberg game
model. It is found that the user may have motivations to deviate
from the Stackelberg equilibrium. Specifically, the users may
deny to forward packets for the content server if it does not
offer higher rewards than that of the Stackeberg equilibrium.
With the repeated game, if the potential benefit is large or if the
users care much about the future reward, they will have higher
incentive to urge the content server to offer higher rewards
than that of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, a cheating
prevention mechanism [102] is used to deal with the cheating
problem from users.
D. Miscellaneous Issues
Besides the use of repeated games for the aforementioned
problems in different types of wireless ad hoc networks, there
are also many other applications of repeated games that will
be discussed in this section.
1) Multiple Accesses: In [104], the authors studied a multi-
ple access game in ad-hoc networks. The authors proposed the
modified multiple access game (MMAG) by adding a regret
cost when no user transmits. The MMAG possesses two pure
Nash equilibria that are also Pareto optimal. If the MMAG is
played repeatedly, there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. Additionally, to improve the network performance, the
authors studied the relation between the regret cost and the
transmission probability. The results demonstrate that based on
this cost, we can adjust other parameters to achieve efficient
equilibria.
A similar scenario is also studied in [105]. However, to
refine Nash equilibria to an efficient equilibrium for better
fairness, social welfare maximization, and Pareto optimality,
the authors in [105] proposed a searching algorithm. The TFT
strategy and generous TFT strategy are also proposed to detect
selfish nodes and attract them to the cooperation. The authors
then extended the game model to a multihop network scenario.
Then, it is shown that although the globally optimal solution
may not be achieved, we still can obtain the Pareto optimal
equilibrium through the proposed game model.
Qu et al. [112] examined the multiple access control scheme
in wireless sensor networks using a TDMA protocol. A re-
peated game is applied to determine the transmission strategy.
The players are the sensors and they send information to
the datacenter. Specifically, each sensor will report its energy
level and queue state to the datacenter. Based on the received
information, the datacenter selects only one sensor which has
the highest measured state to transmit all packets in the data
queue to the datacenter in the rest of the time slot. The payoff
of the sensor is the number of packets successfully transmitted.
However, the sensors may report fake information to obtain
additional benefits. The authors designed a mechanism to de-
tect selfish sensors and used a punishment strategy to enforce
selfish users to cooperate. If the defecting sensor is detected,
all sensors will play a noncooperative game by reporting their
highest state to the datacenter for the next L steps before they
re-cooperate. Nevertheless, the priority of different sensors
should be taken into account in the mechanism.
2) Clustering: In wireless ad hoc networks, due to a large
number of wireless nodes, one of the efficient ways to reduce
energy consumption of the nodes is using a clustering tech-
nique. In [106], the authors considered a clustering problem
in mobile ad hoc networks. The authors first proposed an
algorithm to cluster the nodes into groups. Then, the algorithm
finds a cluster head for each group. The cluster head is able to
communicate with all the nodes in the cluster. However, since
the cluster head will consume more energy than others, the
nodes may not be willing to send true information to avoid
becoming a cluster head. To resolve this issue, the authors
used a repeated game to model the interaction among nodes.
In the game, the nodes are the players, and they can choose
one of two actions, i.e., “honestly” or “dishonestly” reporting
information. The payoff of the node is the gain that is received
from successfully transmitting packets. To detect selfish nodes
and enforce the nodes to cooperate, the authors proposed a
limited punishment mechanism. It is shown that the nodes
have no incentive to deviate from the cooperation, and thus
they have to report information honestly.
3) Security: In the context of wireless sensor network, the
authors in [109] used a repeated game to prevent denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks from malicious sensor nodes. The
repeated game is to model the interaction between the intrusion
detection (ID) node and a set of sensor nodes. The ID node
acts as a base station with the objective to monitor behaviors
of sensors and punish them when they defect through using
reputation as presented in [110]. Therefore, the ID node will
have two actions, namely, punish or not punish. Differently, the
sensor will have two actions, i.e., cooperate or defect. When
the sensor cooperates by forwarding packets, it will not be
punished, and thus it will gain rewards. However, if the sensor
defects and it is detected by the ID node, it will be punished
forever and will be out of the cooperation. Consequently,
this sensor will gain nothing after leaving the cooperation,
while other sensors still in the cooperation gain rewards. The
advantage of this technique is that it handles not only selfish
players, but also malicious users who are aiming to damage
others.
Similar to [109], the authors in [111] also considered the
interaction between the ID node and a set of sensors. However,
while in [109] after a selfish/malicious node is detected, it will
be punished forever, in [111], the node will be punished for
an appropriate number of periods. Then, this node can re-
participate in the cooperation again if it accepts to forward
packets from the other nodes. This scheme will help selfish
nodes to have an opportunity to re-cooperate in order to
improve the network performance.
4) Multi-network Cooperation: The authors in [107] con-
sidered the interaction between two wireless ad hoc networks
through using a repeated game. In this game, the players are
two wireless operators. Each operator has a set of wireless
nodes, and if two operators cooperate by sharing nodes for
relaying traffic, they can help to increase QoS performance for
the entire network. In the cooperation, the operator determines
how many nodes and which nodes should be shared. The pay-
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Fig. 9. Relation among types of repeated games, strategies, and solutions (RG = repeated game, SPE = subgame perfect equilibrium, TFT = Tit-for-Tat) in
wireless ad hoc networks.
off is defined as a function of its cost (e.g., bandwidth usage).
In the repeated game, with a trigger strategy (that is similar
to the grim strategy) and some appropriate conditions of the
discount factor, there exists the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Furthermore, to find the optimal cooperation action profile for
both networks, the Nash bargaining solution [108] is applied.
The results show that the proposed solution can achieve the
performance close to that of a fully cooperative approach. The
system model can be extended by considering different types
of networks, e.g., a relay cellular network and multihop WiFi
network.
Summary: From Table III, we observe that there are
many repeated game models developed for wireless ad hoc
networks. Majority of them are for solving the packet for-
warding problem. However, in wireless ad hoc networks, there
are also many important problems, e.g., quality-of-service,
multicasting, security, as presented in [46] and [47] which
are not well examined using repeated games. Moreover, from
Fig. 9, we observe that compared with the repeated game
models for cellular and WLANs, those for wireless ad hoc
networks use more diverse variations of repeated games and
solution concepts.
V. APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED GAMES IN COGNITIVE
RADIO NETWORKS
This section discusses the applications of repeated games in
cognitive radio networks (CRNs). CRNs are intelligent com-
munication networks that have been designed to improve the
spectrum utilization and transmission efficiency. CRNs allow
unlicensed users, called secondary users, to access opportunis-
tically available spectrum allocated to licensed users, called
primary users [113]. In CRNs, before accessing a licensed
channel, unlicensed users need to check the channel state and
then decide whether to access the channel or not. Therefore,
the applications of repeated games in CRNs mainly focus on
solving two major problems, namely, spectrum sensing and
spectrum usage. Additionally, there are some applications in
pricing competition problem, called spectrum trading, that is
also reviewed in this section.
A. Spectrum Sensing
Spectrum sensing is a task of secondary users (SUs) to
detect the presence of primary users (PUs) through many
sensing techniques such as energy detection, matched filter
detection, and cyclostationary feature detection as presented
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[52] wireless nodes dropping probability benefit minus cost Generous TFT SPE
[57] wireless nodes cooperate or defect benefit minus cost Contrite TFT SPE
[53] [60] wireless nodes forward or dropping benefit minus cost adaptive sequential
[61] wireless nodes cooperate or defect benefit minus cost belief-freeequilibrium belief-free
[58] wireless nodes packet forwardingprobabilities
data transmission
efficiency punishment trigger
perfect
Bayesian
[56] wireless nodes proportion of packetsforwarded benefit minus cost Grim perfect public
[67] wireless nodes transmission power level andforwarding probability
the ratio of achieve
throughput and power
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adaptive Pareto optimal
[68] wireless nodes forward or reject benefit minus cost Generous TFT Pareto optimal
[69] wireless nodes the number of packets sentand forwarded benefit minus cost TFT SPE
[70] wireless nodes forward or reject benefit minus cost improvement ofGenerous TFT SPE
[77] wireless nodes forward or drop benefit minus cost restorative trigger SPE
[71] wireless nodes forward probability benefit minus cost punishment trigger Pareto optimal
[81] wireless nodes forward probability cooperation level The Weakest Linkscheme SPE
[73] wireless nodes cooperate or defect benefit minus cost Cartel maintenanceprofit sharing SPE
[79] wireless nodes report information benefit minus cost T-segmented TFT perfect public
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y [88] source nodes relay or not relay energy conservation conditional trigger SPE[96] source nodes relay or not relay energy conservation punishment trigger Pareto optimal
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[97] wireless peers accept or reject benefit minus cost proportionincrement TFT SPE
[98] wireless peers report buffer information andthe number shared chunks gain minus cost cheat-proof
time-restricted
bargaining
[99] wireless peers report buffer information andthe number shared chunks gain minus cost cheat-proof
time-sensitive
bargaining
[103] wireless peers relay or not relay gain minus cost cheat-proof
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fairness
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[101] content server andpeers
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[105] wireless nodes transmit or stay quiet reward minus cost TFT Pareto optimal
[112] wireless sensornodes
report energy level and
number of packets
the amount of data
successfully transmitted forgiving Pareto optimal
Clustering [106] wireless nodes report honestly or dishonestly gain minus cost Generous TFT SPE
Security [109] intrusion detection(ID) and sensors
ID: miss or catch, sensors:
regular or malicious gain minus cost Grim SPE
[111] intrusion detection(ID) and sensors
ID: miss or catch, sensors:
regular or malicious gain minus cost forgiving SPE
Operators
Coop
[107] wireless ad-hocoperators cooperate or defect
a function of cost
metric Grim SPE
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in [114]. The effectiveness of spectrum sensing is limited by
geographic separation or channel fading, and thus SUs need
to cooperate to overcome this problem. However, SUs may
not be interested in cooperating since they have to exchange
sensing results that consumes a certain amount of resources.
Consequently, a repeated game is a useful tool to motivate
the SUs to cooperate with the aim to improve the quality of
spectrum sensing thereby enhancing the network performance.
In [115], the authors proposed using repeated games to
model the interaction among secondary users (SUs) when they
want to cooperate to sense a common spectrum allocated by a
primary user. In this game, the SUs have two actions, namely,
cooperate or not cooperate. If the SUs are cooperative, they
will share their spectrum sensing results with others. However,
this consumes energy due to broadcasting information. By
contrast, if they are not cooperative, they will gain and lose
nothing. When the profit obtained from sharing sensing results
(i.e., b) is lower than the cost for broadcasting information (i.e.,
c), the SUs will never be cooperative. Otherwise, for b > c,
there is an incentive for the SUs to cooperate if the interaction
among SUs is repeated for sufficiently many periods. In the
repeated game, the authors investigated two strategies, namely,
grim and carrot-and-stick, for two scenarios, i.e., with and
without transmission loss. With the transmission loss, the
SUs may not receive information from others. Consequently,
the SUs will not cooperate and their performance will be
detrimental. It is shown that as the packet loss probability
increases, the ratio b/c must be increased to guarantee the
cooperation among SUs for both the strategies. Furthermore,
the authors concluded that the value of b from the carrot-
and-stick strategy must be twice larger than that of the grim
strategy to make SUs cooperate.
In [116], Kondareddy et al. extended the cooperative sensing
model to packet relay in CRNs. The authors formulated the
cross-layer game which is a combination of a cooperative sens-
ing game and a packet forwarding game. In this cross-layer
game, the SUs choose actions from a set of four independent
actions {Share (S), Do not Share (DS), Forward (F), and Do
not Forward (DF)}. Therefore, there are four possible actions
for each player to choose from, i.e., S-F, S-DF, DS-F, DS-DF.
The payoff is the profit. It is shown that for the one-shot cross-
layer game, the Nash equilibrium is the mutual defection, i.e.,
the players will choose actions (DS-DF) and this leads to
the poor network performance. Nevertheless, if the cross-layer
game is repeated, by using the TFT strategy and under some
conditions for the discount factor, the authors proved that the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the mutual cooperation
strategy for the SUs. The most noticeable achievement of
the repeated cross-layer game is that the players can achieve
cooperation in both spectrum sensing and packet forwarding
by using punishments for packet forwarding action only.
Moreover, the authors considered imperfect observations that
may happen by mistake or due to noise. The game is modeled
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma with noise [117]. By using the
generous TFT strategy [117], the authors showed that the
mutual cooperation strategy for the SUs is the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
In [115] and [116], the authors presented the solutions to
deal with selfish SUs. However, there can be malicious SUs
sharing wrong information. For example, when the primary
channel is idle, the malicious SU can report a busy channel,
and hence no other SUs can use this channel. In [118], the
repeated game model was developed for this problem. The
game is presented in Table IV. Uh and Ud are the profits when
the SUs choose co and no (i.e., cooperate and not cooperate)
actions, respectively. Cs is the cost when SUs participate in
spectrum sensing and Cr is the cost for overhearing the sens-
ing information from other SUs. From this payoff matrix, a
malicious SU will gain a negative profit if it is noncooperative.
Consequently, the malicious SU has no incentive to defect. A
distributed trusted model is used to identify the malicious SU
through the evaluation of SUs’ reputation. Based on the action
history of SUs, the SU can update the global reputation for
its all neighbors. If the global reputation of any SU reaches a
predefined limit, this SU will be identified to be a malicious
and will be punished forever.
TABLE IV
PAYOFF MATRIX
cooperate (co) not cooperate (no)
cooperate (co) Uh-Cr-Cs, Uh-Cr-Cs -Cs-Cr , Ud-Cr
not cooperate (no) Ud-Cr , -Cs-Cr -Cr ,-Cr
B. Spectrum Usage Management
After spectrum sensing, spectrum usage or spectrum access
will be performed. In this section, we review the applications
of repeated games to help secondary users (SUs) to access
available channels. We discuss four major problems which are
illustrated in Fig. 10.
Spectrum Usage Management
Opportunistic 
Spectrum Access
Spectrum Sharing
Spectrum Clustering
Spectrum 
Interference
Fig. 10. Spectrum usage issues.
1) Opportunistic Spectrum Access: Unlike multiple access
control in cellular and WLANs presented in Section III-A,
in CRNs when an SU accesses a licensed channel, it takes
not only the existence of other SUs, but also the presence of
PUs into account. Thus, the spectrum access in CRNs is more
dynamic and more complex than that of cellular and WLANs
networks. One of the popular solutions is using a Markov
model for analysis and optimization. Then a repeated game is
used as a tool to encourage the cooperation for SUs.
In [119], the authors developed the distributed dynamic
spectrum access scheme for SUs and modeled non-cooperation
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relation among SUs as an infinitely repeated game. The players
are the SUs, the actions are to access the idle channel or
not, and the payoff is the average throughput. Since the SUs
can access only an idle channel, the authors used a primary-
prioritized Markov dynamic spectrum access [120] to analyze
the impact of PUs to SUs and derive optimal SU’s channel
access probabilities. Then, by using the Folk theorem, it is
shown that with the discount factor close enough to one, the
game can achieve an efficient Nash equilibrium. To do so,
the authors introduced the distributed self-learning algorithm
for the SUs to obtain the optimal access probabilities. In the
learning algorithm, the SUs start with low access channel
probabilities. In each iteration, the SUs increase the access
channel probability and observe the payoff. If the payoff is
improved, then the SU will continue increasing the channel
access probability. Otherwise, the SU stops. However, the
convergence of the learning algorithm is open for further study.
In [119], a Markov model was developed to optimize
channel access probabilities for SUs. However, as the number
of SUs is large, the computation complexity increases expo-
nentially which causes difficulties in finding optimal policies
for the SUs. Therefore, the authors in [121] proposed a
reduced-complexity suboptimal Markov model. The method
is to separate users’ behaviors, thereby significantly reducing
the state space of the Markov model. To motivate the SUs to
cooperate, a repeated game is used. Additionally, the authors
used the learning algorithm based on the policy gradient
method to update the channel access probability for the SUs
and proposed the solutions to detect and enforce deviating
users into the cooperation which were not addressed in [119].
While [119] and [121] used learning algorithms to control
channel access probabilities, in [122], the authors examined
the CSMA/CA protocol to resolve collisions when SUs access
channels. In the CSMA/CA protocol, when the player trans-
mits data and collision occurs, it selects a random number
w and retransmits after w time slots. Selfish users can take
advantage by reducing the parameter w thereby increasing
the channel access probability. Thus, the authors used the
detection method based on the evaluation of average through-
put. In particular, within a monitoring duration, if a player i
detects that player j has the average throughput higher than
i’s throughput, the player i will notify all other players in the
network. Then, the honest players will punish the selfish player
j by jamming the j’s transmission in the next certain number
of game stages. The authors then established the conditions
for the monitoring duration and punishment period such that
the punishment will be effective to deter the deviation.
2) Interference Control: In underlay spectrum access, i.e.,
SUs access a common channel simultaneously, mutual interfer-
ence occurs. To control the impacts of interference, the trans-
mission power levels at the transmitters have to be carefully
optimized. There are two types of networks studied in the
literature, namely, unlicensed and licensed band networks. In
the unlicensed networks, SUs needs to control the interference
only with other SUs. Conversely, in licensed networks, SUs
have to avoid the interference with PUs as well.
a) Unlicensed band networks: In [123], Etkin et al. stud-
ied the spectrum sharing problem among SUs for interference-
constrained networks. The authors considered the scenario
with M systems (SUs) coexisting in the same area. Each
system includes a pair of a transmitter and a receiver. The
systems share the same unlicensed channel, and this is mod-
eled as a Gaussian interference channel. If the systems are not
cooperative, they will transmit data with high power levels
that leads to severe interference and reducing significantly
network throughput. Therefore, a repeated game is used to
encourage cooperation. In this game, the players are the SUs,
the actions are transmission rates and the payoff is the sum
rates of SUs. The TFT strategy is used to punish selfish users.
Based on the Folk theorem, it is proven that the proposed
strategy achieves the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when
the discount factor is set sufficiently close to one.
To deal with liars who may gain benefit by communicating
fake information (e.g., fake channel measurement), Etkin et
al. extended their work in [123] by introducing a truth telling
method [124]. This method is based on the protocol with
detection mechanisms using test messages exchanged among
SUs together with energy detection. Thus, the repeated game
is modified by adding an initial stage to exchange and verify
the channel measurement in all stages of the repeated game.
If there is any deviation detected, a punishment is triggered
in which all the transmitters spread their power over the total
bandwidth in the rest of the game. The proposed method not
only detects deviations, but also liars who send fake infor-
mation. However, this method requires extensive information
exchange, which could be a shortcoming for energy-limited
networks.
In [123] and [124], after a deviation is detected, all users
will play a noncooperative game forever. This strategy can be
inefficient. To overcome this drawback, the authors in [126]
adopted different strategy, namely, publish-and-forgive. In this
strategy, after detecting the deviation, the noncooperative game
will be played for the next T −1 periods, and then the players
will cooperate again. Besides the cooperation criterion which
maximizes the total throughput (MTT) for the network as
presented in [123] and [124], the authors in [126] considered
different cooperation criterion, i.e., approximated proportional
fairness criterion (APF) to help the players with poor channel
conditions have an equal opportunity to access a channel. The
method to detect liars in [126] is proven to be less complex
and easier to implement that that in [124].
To reduce interference and improve the network perfor-
mance for SUs, the authors in [125] considered using multi-
carrier transmission and studied the interactions among SUs
communicating over the same frequency band composing of
multiple carriers. In the multi-carrier system, the SUs have
to choose the transmission power levels on each carrier to
maximize their own payoff. Again, a repeated game is used
to encourage the SUs to cooperate. In this game, the SUs
cooperate by using Pareto transmission strategies. If any SU
deviates from the cooperation, then the other SUs will choose
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium strategy in the remaining
of the game.
In all above work, to control interference, SUs have to adjust
their transmission power levels. In [128], the authors used an
intervention scheme [129] for repeated games with the aim
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to enlarge the limit set of equilibrium payoffs and loosen the
conditions for the discount factor that needs to be close to
one in general repeated games. In the intervention scheme,
an intervention device is introduced to observe and intervene
interactions among SUs. Specifically, the intervention device
monitors the actions of SUs and then makes decisions (e.g.,
punishment) to deter deviation and enforce cooperation. With
the intervention device, in the repeated game, the players
include SUs and the intervention device. The actions are
transmission power levels and the payoff is throughput. The
protocol is proposed to maximize a joint objective function
(e.g., total throughput of the network). This protocol is shown
to achieve the subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated
game. The author proposed a trigger policy that makes players
cooperate. If any user deviates from the cooperation, it will
be punished for certain number of periods. Simulation results
show good performance of using intervention in terms of sum
payoff and max-min fairness. Additionally, with the support
of the intervention, the set of equilibrium payoffs are extended
and the discount factor condition can be reduced by around
50%.
b) Licensed band networks: To reduce the interference
with PUs on a licensed band, the authors in [127] adopted a
local spectrum server (LSS) as presented in Fig. 11. The LSS
is to control the interference between SUs and PU. The PU
specifies an acceptable interference temperature to the LSS.
The LSS also monitors the activities of SUs in which the
monitoring is imperfect. Thus, a repeated game with imperfect
monitoring [4] is used. After the SUs transmit data, the LSS
measures and compares the interference with a predefined
threshold. If the interference is higher than the threshold, the
LSS will send a warning message to the SUs. Based on the
received information from the LSS, the SUs will adjust power
levels accordingly. The authors then introduced a deviation-
proof policy implemented in a distributed fashion for the SUs.
In the policy, the SUs compute indexes that measure “urgency”
for their data transmission. The SU with the highest index
is chosen to transmit data in a time slot. It is proven that
with the proposed policy, the SUs will achieve an optimal
operating point that will give them no incentive to deviate and
the proposed policy converges to a perfect public equilibrium.
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Distress singnals
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IT limit
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Receiver 1
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g20
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g22
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Fig. 11. An example for using local spectrum server. gij is the channel gain
between entities i and j, where 0 is the local spectrum server.
3) Spectrum Sharing: Spectrum sharing is another method
used to prevent collision and interference. The idea is to divide
the spectrum into non-overlap sub-channels and then allocate
them to users. However, different from bandwidth allocation
in cellular and WLANs networks which have a central node
(e.g., an access point or base station) to control the allocation,
in CRNs, the SUs have to unify or self-define the amount of
used spectrum without any support from a central node. Thus,
SUs may be selfish and they may excessively use spectrum,
thereby significantly degrading the network performance. In
this section we review the applications of repeated games for
spectrum sharing.
In [130], the authors considered the spectrum sharing
problem between two WLAN networks when they coexist
in the same area and share a common unlicensed spectrum
to serve their users. The WLANs need to compete with
each other to use the spectrum. A repeated game is used to
encourage WLANs as the players to cooperate. The actions of
WLANs are choosing the amount of spectrum. The action is
defection if it maximizes the payoff. Alternatively, the action
is cooperation if the MAC parameters of the WLAN are
less aggressive and take opponents’ actions into account. The
payoff is QoS measure of the players in terms of achievable
throughput, period length, and delay. The authors considered
static strategies, i.e., always cooperate, always defect, ran-
dom policy (50% cooperate and 50% defect), and dynamic
strategies, i.e., grim and TFT. Numerical results show that
different strategies are appropriate for different circumstances
depending on the QoS requirements. For example, when the
QoS requirements of player 1 is (throughput=0.1, period
length=0.05, and delay=0.02) and for player 2 is (through-
put=0.4, period length=0.031, and delay=0.02), the authors
showed that the best strategy for player 1 is always cooperate.
However, the best strategy for player 2 is TFT.
In [136], the authors studied a cognitive radio network with
two SUs sharing a common unlicensed channel. The SUs can
cooperate by using half of bandwidth through the frequency
division multiplexing (FDM) technique or not cooperate by
spreading their transmit power, called STP, over the entire
bandwidth. The authors proposed a scheme to detect the
selfishness of a rival player. The authors then designed a guard
interval for the SUs, if a player starts by cooperating and after
the guard interval, the rival player still does not cooperate,
the cooperative player will choose to perform STP (i.e., not
cooperate). Through the analysis and simulation, it is shown
that the proposed strategy can achieve mutual cooperation and
the equilibrium is stable.
In previous papers, the spectrum usage schemes are random,
i.e., the demand parameters are selected randomly at the begin-
ning of the game [130], or they work under some predefined
assumption, for example, SUs choose FDM or STP [136].
In [132], the authors proposed an alternative method for the
use of bandwidth through exchanging information among SUs.
In particular, before making decisions to access the channels,
an access point reports its traffic demands to all other access
points in the same network. Based on the information received
from the access points and its demand, the access point
will make channel usage decision. If the interaction among
access points takes place one time, the access points will
play a noncooperative game by claiming the highest traffic
demand. However, when the interaction lasts for multiple
periods, a repeated game can be used to model and enforce
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the access points to cooperate by informing the true informa-
tion. In [132], it is shown that by using trigger punishment
strategies [133], there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
for the proposed repeated game. The length of the punishment
phase is determined in a similar way to that in [126] and with
the punishment phase, the selfish access point will have no
incentive to deviate.
Extended from [132], in [131], the authors used two specific
cheat-proof mechanisms along with a method to identify
the information from access points which was not provided
in [132]. The first mechanism is based on the “transfer” in
Bayesian theory [18]. With this mechanism, the access points
are asked to pay a tax when they use high traffic demands
and the access points with low bandwidth demand will be
compensated from the tax. The tax will be increased according
to the declaration of traffic demand, and thus the access points
have to balance between traffic demand and monetary budget.
Then, the payoff of the access points is defined such that it
can gain the highest payoff if the access points report true
information. In the second mechanism, the authors studied a
statistical cheat-proof strategy for the repeated game. Here,
the access point is considered as a deviator if it overuses the
allocated spectrum and after being detected, the selfish access
point will not be allocated bandwidth until its average usage
is under a safety range.
In [134], Xie et al. studied the spectrum sharing problem
between satellites and terrestrial cognitive radio networks
(CRNs). The authors considered a scenario where there is
a satellite in an area with two other CRNs (e.g., two base
stations), and they compete for a common unlicensed spectrum
band allocated by primary users. The satellite can interfere
with both CRNs; however, there is no interference between two
CRNs. Since the movement of a satellite is often very fast, the
satellite is in the interference area for very short time period.
Due to the short interaction, the repeated game considered in
this paper is a finitely repeated game. The players of the game
are satellite (BS1), and two CRNs (BS2, BS3). The authors
assumed that the size of the band is totally 2W , and thus the
players can choose to occupy one band (i.e., W ) or all two
bands (i.e., 2W ). The payoff function is the achievable rate.
The players know the end of the game, and thus there is a
Nash equilibrium, which is the noncooperative strategy where
the players always spread their power over all 2W bands.
Additionally, the authors addressed the issue of partially blind
observations. Specifically, BS2 and BS3 cannot observe the
actions of each other. Moreover, BS2 and BS3 may not know
the existence of the satellite and cannot observe its actions.
To resolve partially blind observations, the authors proposed
using refreshing TFT (R-TFT). The R-TFT is an extension of
the TFT strategy where the cooperation is refreshed quickly
once one of the players cooperates. When the observations of
the players are affected by noise, the TFT strategy becomes
an ineffective strategy. Therefore, the authors investigated
two schemes, namely, refreshing contrite TFT (RC-TFT) and
refreshing generous TFT (RG-TFT), which are based on the
contrite TFT and generous TFT strategy in [117]. Here, the
refreshing process is applied when a satellite appears in the
area. After an efficient equilibrium is obtained between the
satellite and the BSs, the G-TFT and C-TFT are applied to
circumvent an adverse impact from noise.
4) Cooperative Clustering: Recently, there have been some
research work considering clustering problems in CRNs. In
clustered CRNs, some SUs are grouped together to access
a channel cooperatively. This can avoid an over-accessing
problem when the number of SUs is large.
Clustering is an effective energy saving solution for SUs
in CRNs. Traditionally, SUs must transmit data directly to
distant base stations, causing contention and consuming ex-
cessive energy. With clustering, some SUs can use short range
communication to transfer data, thereby reducing congestion
and energy consumption. However, when clusters are formed,
there must be an effective way to motivate SUs to cooperate
by transmitting data for each other. In [142], the authors
developed a repeated packet forwarding game to model an
interaction among SUs in the same cluster. Each SU has two
actions, i.e., cooperate by forwarding packet for others or not.
The payoff is the profits minus the cost for forwarding packets.
It is shown that the grim strategy can lead to the Pareto-optimal
Nash equilibrium where the players want to cooperate.
Li et al. [143] extended the clustering model in CRNs
proposed in [142] by using cluster-head SU. In particular,
each cluster will have a cluster-head SU which is responsible
to receive packets from other SUs in the same cluster and
transmit them over primary channels as shown in Fig. 12.
With the centralized model through the cluster-head SU, the
SUs can avoid frequent collision and reduce delay of packet
transmission. The idea of clustering and nomination cluster-
head SU is based on the use of weight metrics, including
the ideal degree, transmission power, and battery power as
introduced in [144]. A repeated game is used to model the
interaction between SUs in the same cluster, and through using
the grim strategy, the authors proved that the game can achieve
Pareto optimality.
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Fig. 12. A repeated game for clustered cognitive radio networks.
C. Spectrum Trading
Repeated games are also used for spectrum trading between
SUs and primary users (PUs). In CRNs, PUs can sell their
spectrum to SUs to gain revenue and improve spectrum utiliza-
tion. However, when there are multiple PUs selling spectrum,
they have to choose appropriate offer prices to attract SUs and
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APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED GAMES IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
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[115] Secondary users sharing spectrum results profit minus cost Carrot-and-Stick SPE
[116] Secondary users sharing spectrum resultsand forwarding packets profit minus cost
TFT and
Generous-TFT SPE
[118] Secondary users andmalicious uses sharing spectrum results profit minus cost cheat-proof SPE
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[119], [121] Secondary users channel access probability achievable throughput punishment trigger SPE
[122] Secondary users backoff counter achievable throughput cheat-proof Pareto optimal
[123], [124] pairs oftransmitter-receiver power levels transmission rates TFT SPE
[126] pairs oftransmitter-receiver power levels achievable throughput cheat-proof SPE
[125] pairs oftransmitter-receiver
power levels on
multi-carrier achievable rates Cartel maintain Pareto optimal
[127] pairs oftransmitter-receiver power levels achievable throughput cheat-proof perfect public
[128]
pairs of
transmitter-receiver
and an intervention
power levels achievable throughput forgiving SPE
[130] WLANs MAC parameters a function of QoS Grim, TFT, and staticstrategies SPE
[136] secondary users FDM or STP achievable transmissionrate adaptive SPE
[132] access points exchange information spectrum usage punishment trigger SPE
[131] access points exchange information spectrum usage cheat-proof SPE
[134] a satellite and twobase stations spectrum usage achievable rate variations of TFT SPE
[142], [143] SUs in the samecluster forward or reject profits minus cost Grim Pareto optimal
Spectrum
Trading
[137] primary users prices profits Grim SPE
[139] primary users prices profits Grim SPE
compete with each other. A repeated game is used to help PUs
in pricing.
In [137], the authors considered an interaction among
primary services when they provide and sell opportunistic
spectrum accesses for SUs. The players are primary services
and the strategy is to offer the price per unit of spectrum.
The payoff is the profit from selling bandwidth to SUs minus
the cost for spectrum sharing, e.g., due to QoS degradation
of PUs. The authors first formulated the competitive pricing
problem among PUs as the Bertrand game [138]. If this game
is played only one time, then the solution of the game is the
noncooperative and inefficient Nash equilibrium. However, if
the game is played repeatedly, there is a motivation for the
primary services to cooperate by offering collusive prices that
maximize their profits. A trigger strategy is used to force
players to cooperate.
In [137], the authors assumed that PUs always have avail-
able spectrum to sell to SUs. However, in reality, such licensed
spectrum may not be available when PUs are using it. The
authors in [139] considered this problem by assuming the
probability to have a unit of available bandwidth in each
time slot. The authors showed that there is no pure Nash
equilibrium for the one-shot game, and thus the authors
considered a special class of a Nash equilibrium, called a
symmetric Nash equilibrium [140]. Then, the one-shot game
is proven to possess the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
For the repeated game, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) is adopted. However, the efficiency of the SPNE is
shown to be low. Thus, the authors proposed a Nash reversion
strategy [141] to make players cooperate and improve the
efficiency of the SPNE. The Nash reversion is stated as
follows. At the beginning of the game, the players select a
maximum price and this selection will be remained as long
as no player deviates. If there is at least one player deviating,
all players will play the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy
as in the one-shot game. Finally, the efficiency of the above
SPNE is proven to be maximal if the discount factor satisfies
a certain condition.
Summary: From Table V and Fig. 13, we observe that
most of repeated game models developed for CRNs are
conventional repeated games. Their main aim is to solve
spectrum management problems. Nevertheless, there are few
repeated game models for the cooperative spectrum sensing
and trading. Moreover, there is only one finitely repeated game
model [134].
VI. APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED GAMES IN OTHER
NETWORKS
Apart from the traditional wireless networks, in this section,
we review some important applications of repeated games
in special types of networks including network coding, fiber
wireless access, and multicast networks.
A. Wireless Network Coding
The core idea of network coding is to combine received
packets and transmitting them together in the same flow
instead of simply forwarding each packet separately [145].
In [147] and [148], the authors introduced using network
coding in a butterfly network including two source nodes s1
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and s2 and two destination nodes t1 and t2 as shown in Fig. 14.
Two types of packets from s1 and s2 are “routing” or “network
coding”. A routing packet yn will be forwarded immediately
after it is sent to node i. A network coding packet zn will
be encoded together with others using XOR encoding [146].
When source nodes s1 and s2 send network coding packets
to node i, they also have to send “remedy data” vn to their
destinations t1 and t2, through their side links (s1, t2) and
(s2, t1), respectively. The transmission on each link incurs a
certain cost. Thus, the source nodes need to make a decision
to choose the transmission rates, i.e., yn, zn, and vn. For a
noncooperative one-shot game, it is proven that the nodes will
choose the noncooperative strategy (zn=vn=0). In particular,
the nodes will not use the network coding to avoid payments
over the links (s1,t2) and (s2,t1), and this strategy is the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game. However, if the game is
played repeatedly and by using the grim trigger strategy, the
nodes can achieve the subgame perfect equilibrium in which
the nodes have an incentive to cooperate. Additionally, to
find the efficient common network coding rate for the nodes,
the bargaining game model is introduced. The results show
that by using the proposed solution, the worst-case efficiency
compared with the optimal network performance can be upper-
bounded by 48% as shown in [151] and [152]. In [153],
the repeated game for network coding considers not only a
forwarding action, but also the number of transmissions, the
set of upstream nodes, and the set of downstream nodes. The
authors showed that there exists a strategy profile that is a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
B. Fiber Wireless Access Networks
In [149] and [150], the authors applied a repeated game
to Fiber-wireless (FiWi) access mesh networks (AMNs).
There is a difference between traditional wireless mesh net-
works (TWMNs) and FiWi access mesh networks (AMNs).
In TWMNs, packets are sent to any node in the network.
By contrast, in FiWi AMNs, packets are always transmitted
through gateways. Therefore, FiWi AMNs concern about the
interaction between forwarding and gateway nodes. In the
repeated game, the players are the forwarding and gateway
nodes. The actions are to set the amount of foreign and local
traffics. The payoff of the forwarding nodes is a gain function
minus a cost function. The payoff for the gateway nodes is
only a gain function. The forwarding node can defect by
forwarding small amount of foreign traffic and high amount of
local traffic. However, the gateway can punish the defecting
node and thus curtail its payoff in the future. Through the
repeated game model, there is an incentive for the nodes to
cooperate resulting in the better network performance.
C. Wireless Multicast Networks
The authors in [154] examined the application of repeated
games in wireless multicast networks. The authors considered
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a single hop multicast network with a base station and a group
of nodes receiving packets from the base station with two
phases. In the first phase, the base station transmits multicast
packets to the group of nodes and selects a relay node that
successfully receives the packets from the base station. In the
second phase, the relay node will rebroadcast the packets to
other nodes. The relay node can gain some benefit from the
other nodes, but it incurs a certain cost for the relay node.
Therefore, selfish nodes may not be interested in forwarding
packets. The repeated game model is developed to encourage
the node to cooperate. In this game, the nodes are the players
and if the node is selected as a relay node, it has to choose
transmission power levels to rebroadcast packets. The payoff is
the reward from the number of successfully forwarded packets
minus the cost. The worst behavior TFT incentive strategy is
proposed to enforce the nodes into the cooperation. By using
the punishment strategy, the authors proved that the nodes can
achieve the subgame perfect equilibrium in both the cases of
perfect monitoring and imperfect monitoring.
D. Other Networks
Besides the aforementioned networks, there are some appli-
cations of repeated games in miscellaneous wireless networks
such as vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) [155], small
cell networks [156], wireless network virtualization [157], and
wireless mesh networks [158]. In [155], a repeated game is
used to model packet forwarding strategies of vehicular nodes
based on QoS optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol.
In [156], the power control problem of small cell networks is
modeled as a repeated game. The setting is similar to other
typical repeated game-based power control schemes except
that there is co-channel interference among densely deployed
small cells.
VII. SUMMARIES, OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
A. Summary
In Fig. 15, we summarize key information from this survey.
From Fig. 15 (a), we observe that almost all papers focus
on using conventional repeated games (approximately 60%),
while other extensions have not been much used. This is a
potential research opportunity. Furthermore, we summarize the
percentage of repeated game models for different types of
wireless networks in Fig. 15 (b). We also show the research
trend for each network in Fig. 15 (c). From Fig. 15 (b), we
observe that majority of applications are for wireless ad hoc
networks, followed by cognitive radio networks, and cellular
and WLANs, subsequently. However, from Fig. 15 (c), while
the applications of repeated games in traditional networks
subside, those of emerging networks have increasingly grown.
B. Challenges and Open Issues of Repeated Games in Wire-
less Networks
1) Applications with finitely repeated games: Through this
survey, most repeated game models are for infinite time
horizon and there is only one application of finitely repeated
game [134]. However, there are many issues in wireless
networks that require the models developed for a short-term
context such as [159], [160], [161]. Therefore, the study of
effective solutions to the finitely repeated games is essential.
2) Defining payoff functions: Similar to other game models,
the most challenging part of developing repeated game models
for wireless networks is defining a payoff. The payoff function
must capture and balance network performance and individual
player’s incentive. More importantly, the physical meaning
of the function must be well justified. Nevertheless, some
important properties of repeated games (e.g., existence of an
equilibrium) depend on the payoff function. Therefore, it is
important to determine a formal approach to define the payoff
function of the players in the game.
3) Sequential decisions: In repeated games, the actions of
players are assumed to be taken simultaneously. However,
in some wireless networks, the players may not take action
precisely at the same time. One of the solutions to such a
situation, specifically sequential decision making, is a Stakel-
berg game. The combination of repeated game and Stakelberg
game allows us to solve the non-simultaneous decision making
problems. In [101], the authors considered this game setting.
4) The mixed-strategy: Repeated games assume that all
players follow the same strategy. For example, if one player
uses the TFT strategy, all other players also have to play
the TFT strategy. This assumption may not be true in some
cases in which different players can adopt different strategies.
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This leads to the difficulty in finding an equilibrium of the
game. In [74], the authors studied this problem through using
simulations and stated that evolutionary games can be one of
the potential solutions.
C. Potential Research Directions of Repeated Games in Next
Generation Wireless Communication Systems
1) Mobile cloud computing: Mobile cloud computing
(MCC) is a convergence model of mobile devices, service
providers, wireless networks and cloud computing to bring
benefits to mobile users, mobile applications developers, and
cloud providers [3]. In MCC, different entities can cooperate
to achieve better performance and profit. For example, cloud
providers can cooperate with mobile operators. To attract them
to cooperate, a repeated game can be applied.
2) Wireless powered communication networks: The re-
markable advancement of wireless energy harvesting and
transfer technologies has created many new research directions
recently [163], [164]. The introduction of wireless energy
harvesting techniques has solved inherent problems of wireless
networks, i.e., energy-constraint problem of wireless nodes,
thereby bringing many new applications such as wireless body
area networks [165] or wireless charging [166]. However, as
energy becomes the resource that can be shared efficiently, in-
centive mechanisms for wireless energy harvesting and transfer
nodes have to be developed. In this case, repeated games can
be adopted for such mechanisms.
3) Machine-to-machine communication in 5G networks:
With the emerging of Internet-of-Things (IoT) and 5G net-
works, the number of wireless devices is expected to dra-
matically increase [167]. Through the concept of machine-
to-machine (M2M) communication, the wireless devices has
to contend for limited radio resource, and cooperation is
construed as desirable behavior to achieve efficient network
operation. However, due to large number of devices, enforcing
the cooperation becomes a complex task, and a conventional
repeated game cannot be simply applied. An extension of the
game to support a large number of players is worthwhile for
studying.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A repeated game is a powerful tool to model and resolve
an interaction and conflict in wireless networks. In this paper,
we have presented a comprehensive survey of the repeated
game models developed for a variety of wireless networks.
We have provided basic and fundamental of the game as well
as demonstrated its advantages. Basically, the applications of
repeated games can be divided based on the types of networks,
i.e., cellular and WLANs, wireless ad-hoc networks, and
cognitive radio networks. In addition to detailed reviews of the
related work, we have also provided analysis, comparisons and
summaries of the literature. Furthermore, some open issues
and future research directions of repeated games in wireless
networks have been highlighted. In conclusion, this paper will
be a keystone for understanding repeated games in wireless
communication systems.
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